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“I am a person in my own  
right and I would like to be  
as independent as possible”
Cecilia
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Government published the Green Paper on Pensions in October 2007 and called for a widespread 
debate on the future development of old age pensions informed both by the Green Paper and the 
suite of reports published by the Pensions Board. In this report, offered as a contribution to the 
emerging debate on pensions, the National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) sets out its views 
on the policy issues involved. It does this against a background in which women’s needs and 
perspectives in relation to pensions have not yet been specifically debated. In short, the report 
aims to engender the Irish pension debate. The recommendations made in this paper are not only 
beneficial for women but can also form part of an antipoverty strategy, in that they are also beneficial 
for the many low income groups who experience cumulative labour market disadvantage and a 
subsequent high risk of poverty in old age.
Gender and Pensions
The starting point the NWCI adopts in this study is the 
need to explicitly view pension policy from a gender 
perspective. First, women’s access to pensions was 
historically restricted and reflected the general male 
breadwinner character of social welfare, taxation and 
employment arrangements. One of the first tasks of future 
reforms should be the final removal of discrimination. 
Second, the study emphasises that currently fewer women 
than men in old age have independent access to pensions 
and that the level and sources of their income in old age 
differ from those of men. These differences arise from 
past and current differences between men and women 
in relation to their respective roles in the economy and 
the family: women still earn less, work fewer hours and 
withdraw from the labour market to a greater extent  
than men.
Third, the international experience of pension reform 
shows that women and men may be affected differently 
by any given reform option. In other words, the NWCI 
is concerned that some reform options mooted for 
consideration in Ireland may be distinctly unfair from a 
woman’s perspective. The government, for instance, has 
attempted to make the case for mandatory supplementary 
pensions because of the low take-up of voluntary 
(supplementary) pensions. Such a reform would tie the 
pensions system as a whole more closely to the nexus 
of employment and earnings, and would therefore 
exacerbate rather than mitigate gender inequalities.
These analytical concerns are all the more important in 
light of the fact that women comprise a majority of the 
older population.
Pension reform
The NWCI stresses that the general social policy criteria 
it invokes are widely shared (and they are to some extent 
reflected in the Green Paper and Pensions Board reports). 
These criteria include, in particular: 
• Adequacy – state pensions should prevent financial 
 poverty in relative income terms;
• Comprehensiveness – the requirement to have a  
 pension system that is inclusive;
• Simplicity – the need to structure pensions so that  
 older workers and pensioners have clear transparent 
 pensions that allow them to plan work, retirement  
 and savings arrangements;
• Redistribution – the desire to ensure a net 
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redistribution from higher to lower income groups 
in the financing of pensions and the structure of  
pensions in payment.
•  Risk – the economic and financial risks of pension
provision should be shared across the state, 
employers and employees. 
Gender and pension reform 
In addition to these general policy principles, however, 
the NWCI makes the following two points. First, 
while these principles are widely supported they are 
particularly important for women. For example, if state 
pensions are not adequate, women lose relatively more 
than men, as women are more likely than men to rely on 
state pensions. Second, these general principles need to be 
augmented by critical gender-specific principles that are 
central to the vision of the NWCI. These principles centre 
on a vision of a society where men and women enjoy the 
same power to define their lives and the type of society 
they live in. It is a vision of the future in which both care 
and employment are shared more equally by men and 
women and which achieves gender equality outcomes. In 
pursuit of this vision, pension policy needs to promote the 
following gender-specific principles: 
Economic autonomy. Financial autonomy and 
individual entitlement are core characteristics of a 
feminist pension model. The key challenge for a feminist 
model is to move to a feminist model of pensions where 
women have direct pension rights. 
Labour Market Equality. Gender inequality in 
pensions is primarily a function of cumulative labour 
market inequality. A woman-friendly pension cannot 
happen without measures to address gender inequality in 
working life and without reforms to support and maximise 
high levels of female labour market participation for 
considerable periods of their adult lives. 
Facilitating atypical work. Gender equality in 
pensions requires a pension model that recognises and 
rewards all labour market participation.
Ethic of care. No reform can be complete without the 
development of a care contingency that enables care work 
to be facilitated and respected, and that enables women 
to have pension cover and maintain pension contribution 
records during key stages of care.
Equal sharing of care obligations. The method of 
facilitating and/or compensating for time spent caring 
during working age should not disproportionately lock 
women into long-term patterns of caring. This requires 
the State to invest in a child and elder care infrastructure, 
and also requires the state to have parallel policy 
promoting men’s full engagement with care obligations. 
This can be achieved by way of statutory family-friendly 
policy, obligatory paid paternal leave and supporting 
traditionally male employment sectors to engage more 
fully in developing work/life balance policy and culture.
Pension equality or pension justice. While working 
towards greater gender equality in terms of participation 
in care and employment the pensions system must not 
reinforce and must be capable of compensating for the 
disproportionate time women spend in periods of care 
and the wider gender inequality women experience in the 
labour market
Retrospective pensions justice. The pensions model 
must be able to compensate for the disproportionate 
time older Irish women have already spend in periods 
of care and the significant historical discriminatory 
practices (until 1973 married Irish women were banned 
from public employment and women also experienced 
other discriminatory policies and practices) which led to 
significant gender inequality in the labour market. 
Special attention is drawn here to principles of economic 
autonomy for women and an ethic of care that values 
and rewards care in the context of gender-neutral care 
policies. These principles have implications for many 
aspects of pension provision. At a general level it requires 
policy makers to ensure that the pensions system as 
a whole is not predicated on male lifetime patterns of 
work and earnings: on the contrary, the NWCI insists 
that women’s continuing experience of lower earnings, 
fewer years employment and greater contribution to 
unpaid care work should not exclude them from an 
adequate, independent pension in old age. There are also 
many specific aspects of pension design that impinge on 
women’s financial autonomy in old age: the degree to 
which (and the manner in which) care work is counted 
in social insurance; the unit of assessment for means-
tested pensions, whether individuals or couples; the 
relative roles of first-tier versus second-tier pensions; the 
adequacy of first-tier state pensions on which women rely 
disproportionately; the use of unisex or separate-sex life 
tables in annuity calculations, and so on.
Gender and pensions – Overall strategy 
The policy principles reflecting the concerns of the NWCI 
and the international experience of pension provision and 
reform suggest the following strategic lessons for Ireland.
The critical decision is the relative importance in the 
pension system of the first-tier state pension. Specifically, 
the core of the pension system should be an adequate, 
comprehensive pension guarantee for all individual men 
and women. The stronger the first tier of pensions, the 
lower the level of poverty and the greater the access 
women have to an independent pension in old age.
• In relation to adequacy, the structure and amount of 
state pensions should build on the so-called ‘paradox  
of redistribution’. Policy should not only prevent 
financial poverty but guarantee a decent quality 
of life by offering income replacement levels 
significantly above the ‘poverty line’, rather than 
targeting means-tested pensions to those on lower 
incomes to alleviate their poverty.
• The redistributive impact of pensions arises not
only from the generosity (or otherwise) of pensions 
but also from the mix of direct state expenditures 
and indirect tax expenditures. Even if these are not 
wholly equivalent, there is a clear trade-off between 
tax subsidies (for example to occupational and 
private pensions) and improvements to the state 
pension. Indirectly, women benefit less  
than men from tax expenditures, and therefore 
general equity considerations and gender equality 
principles suggest that reforms should focus on  
a considerably enhanced state pension in the  
context of a more limited use of tax allowances  
for supplementary pensions.
The NWCI acknowledges that a pension appropriate  
to Ireland’s evolving circumstances requires the 
development of a second-tier pension. However, NWCI 
suggests that neither the recently introduced PRSA 
scheme nor the option of a mandatory second-tier pension 
is appropriate. Aside from general social arguments 
against such provisions (shifting of risk to individuals, 
uncertain pension outcomes, need for tax support, 
the inability of such reforms to improve the incomes 
of current pensioners), these pensions tie the second-
tier directly to workers’ capacity to fund pensions and 
therefore to their incomes and employment: this would  
be to women’s disadvantage.
• Stressing that the critical issue is the link between 
the first and second tier, the NWCI proposes that, 
if a second-tier pension is to introduced, it should 
take the form of a state earnings- related pension 
that builds on the existing, widely accepted 
social insurance system. This should have low 
entry thresholds in terms of income and hours 
worked, offer scope for credits for periods of non-
employment for care, and apply an earnings formula 
that allows women to reflect their ‘best’ years in 
terms of earnings. 
Gender and Pensions – specific reform priorities
NWCI recognises that, in developing this vision of a 
pension model, specific short-term reforms are required 
in themselves and as steps that are incrementally 
consistent with the recommended longer-term strategy.
Comprehensive Pension Guarantee 
Make adequacy and individual entitlement the immediate, 
core function of first-tier pensions. Over a time period 
introduce an adequate universal pension for all over 66 
and resident in Ireland for a minimum of ten years.
Social Assistance aspects of pension provision.
The means testing system needs comprehensive reform  
to ensure maximum coverage and maximum level  
of individual entitlement within a partial household 
resource test. All of these reforms could be introduced  
in the short term. 
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a) Full individualisation of old age non-contributory 
 pension; 
b) Introduction of means-tested parental allowance  
 as discussed in DSFA (2006);
c) Abolition of the ‘limitation rule’ and the qualified  
 adult allowance and changes to the household means 
 test formula to maximise economic autonomy;
e) Reform of Carer’s allowance/Benefit into a ‘wage’,  
 facilitating care of older and infirm people to be  
 valued as paid work 
f) Information campaigns, administrative changes 
and resources to ensure consistency in regional 
application of guidelines, so that each individual  
man and woman is exercising his/her full potential  
to be an individual claimant.
Social Insurance aspect of pension provision 
As a long-term objective, introduce an income 
replacement function into social insurance, but more 
immediately gender-sensitive social insurance old age 
contributory pensions, as follows:
a) Ensure maximum eligibility by permitting short time 
spans for minimum entitlement, moving away from 
an average contribution test to a shorter time span 
for testing contributions, switching from rewarding 
‘maximum number of years’ contribution records  
to a ‘best of’ rule over shorter periods that allows 
the most beneficial period to be chosen for pension 
contribution periods.
b)  Ensure that benefit calculations advantage women 
by avoiding averaging over ‘last’ years of 
employment when the gender pay gap can be more 
pronounced, and having tiered gradual movements 
across contributions-based entitlements and across 
averaged earnings.
c) Maximise access by enabling easy re-entry after 
periods of disruption. This would entail reforming 
the S.57 SI 312 1996 rule, according to which a 
person with no SI record for more than two years 
must have 26 paid contributions before credits can 
be awarded. It would also reform social insurance 
contribution rules to enable relatives assisting, 
including spouses of self-employed and farmers, to 
be insured as employees.
d) Accommodate care and address previous pension 
injustice by transforming homemakers’ disregards 
into credits and awarding these retrospectively  
from 1973. 
e) Promote a gender-neutral care ethic by introducing 
paid parental leave benefit for parents of young 
children.
f) Acknowledge the previous injustice of the 
‘marriage bar’ with a once-off, ring-fenced 
retrospective scheme.
Voluntary pension recommendations 
There are various reforms to the tax treatment of 
pensions that could bring greater equity and more 
progressive income distribution outcomes.
a) In the next and subsequent budgets it should 
be possible to make the tax treatment of pensions 
more equitable. A variety of specific reforms should 
be considered, including full abolition of tax relief 
for private and occupational pensions, restricting 
such relief to standard rate relief, introducing more 
stringent caps on the use of reliefs, and limiting  
the use of Approved Retirement Funds as tax 
avoidance measures.
b) Examine options for savings schemes that are 
supported by the State and structured progressively  
to benefit those on lower incomes.
c) Encourage Credit Unions, and the Money Advice and 
Budgeting Service, to introduce a state-backed low 
charge savings product for low income earners.
d) Regulate to require unisex life plans and pension 
 splitting.
Governance 
Effective, gender-inclusive, transparent governance 
systems are also required. The NWCI has entered the 
pensions debate and will seek formal representation in key 
pensions policy institutions including the Pensions Board. 
It will also seek to ensure pensions policy is fully engaged 
with in the National Women’s Strategy. The NWCI will also 
insist that all data on pensions (including tax reliefs and 
private pensions) are disaggregated by gender. The NWCI, 
as a participant in the social partnership process, will seek 
to ensure that the evolving Developmental Welfare State 
framework underpinning recent national partnership 
agreements more fully incorporates a gender analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
In the media coverage of these proposed reforms – and  
in the limited public debate about them – gender has 
hardly been visible. This report redresses this deficit by 
placing gender at the centre of debate about pension 
policy in Ireland, and suggests that a gender-sensitive 
approach to pension reform would widen the options 
for consideration and ultimately lead to a fairer, more 
adequate pension system overall. NWCI argues that the 
core of the future pension system should be an adequate, 
comprehensive state pension which can be supplemented 
by social insurance, occupational pensions and other 
income sources. 
Chapter one gives an overview of the Irish pension  
system and of recent themes in pension reform. Chapter 
two gives a historical and comparative context. Chapter 
three, building on the Council’s earlier work on women 
and social welfare2, elaborates a gender perspective on 
pensions. The final chapter outlines the broad strategy  
and specific recommendations being advanced by the 
National Women’s Council. An equality proofing exercise  
is included as Appendix A. 
This report is not comprehensive. Its focus is largely – 
although not exclusively – on the state system of social 
insurance and social assistance pensions, and on the 
potential role supplementary private pensions might 
have. The concern in this report is primarily to respond 
to the government’s Green Paper3 and associated Pensions 
Board documents, and to introduce a much-needed gender 
perspective on future pension reform. Undoubtedly, other 
important aspects of pensions deserve detailed analysis, 
notably the impact of the ‘marriage bar’ on the exclusion 
of many of many of today’s older women from entitlement 
to pensions in their own right.
This study offers a gender perspective on pension reform in Ireland. Women comprise the majority 
of the older population and historically were treated in a discriminatory fashion in the ‘male 
breadwinner model’ of social welfare. Against this background it is remarkable that in the recent 
flurry of official documents on pension reform gender has relatively received little attention. Currently, 
policy debate is framed in the terms of the various reports of The Pensions Board1. Briefly, the under-
lying theme of these reports is the low coverage in the labour force of supplementary pensions, and 
the need to expand this coverage by exhorting the labour force to save through Personal Retirement 
Savings Accounts (PRSAs), and by offering incentives for them to do so by way of tax deductions. 
As it has proved difficult to expand coverage significantly in this way, policy makers’ attention then 
turned to the possibility of mandatory coverage of supplementary pensions. More recently, the Green 
Paper on Pensions offered a detailed analysis of the pensions system and of the options for reform, 
reviewed the various reports of the Pensions Board and considered a wide variety of possible reforms. 
1 The most recent of these are: Securing Retirement Income (1998), National Pensions Review (2005) and Special Savings for Retirement:  
 Report on Mandatory Pension System to Minister for Social and Family Affairs (2006).
2  See the National Women’s Council’s reports Valuing Care Work (2002) and A Woman’s Model for Social Welfare Reform (2003).
3  Green Paper on Pensions, Department of Social and Family Affairs (2007).
Pensions: What Women Want Pensions: What Women Want
“I have no social insurance 
credits and am only entitled 
to a non-contributory old age 
pension when that time  
comes. The contributions paid 
on the farm only benefits  
my husband.”
Lily
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CHAPTER ONE
The Irish Pension System, Existing and Proposed
It is necessary at this point to define some terms that  
are frequently used in this and subsequent chapters. 
State pensions. This refers to the three Old Age 
Pensions payable by the state in Ireland: the Contributory 
Old Age Pension, based on social insurance contributions 
and payable at age 66; the Transition pension, also based 
on social insurance pensions, but payable at age 65 and 
requiring a more complete social insurance record; the 
Non-contributory Old Age Pension, based on a means test 
and also payable at age 66.
First-tier/Second-tier pensions. Many countries have 
two levels of pension, a ‘basic’ or initial pension invariably 
provided by the state, and a second source of pension 
income which can come from the state, employers, or 
individually acquired pensions. These second sources 
may be obligatory or voluntary, and funded through a 
variety of possible mechanisms. The metaphor of ‘tiers’ 
(alternatively referred to as ‘pillars’) attempts to capture 
the overall structure of the pension system, as some 
states have only one tier and many have two or more. 
The second tier of pensions in Ireland is not obligatory 
and the immediate policy option repeatedly referred to 
throughout is whether, and how, Ireland should construct 
a comprehensive second tier.
Supplementary pensions. This term is used 
interchangeably with ‘second tier’. It refers also to the 
second tier, but clearly conveys the point that an actual  
or proposed second tier may be viewed as an addition to  
a first-tier state pension and therefore has the role  
of ‘supplementing’ the first tier to bring total pension 
income to a more adequate level.
The Development of the  
State Pension System in Ireland
The evolution of state pensions up to the present  
day can be divided into three broad phases, as follows: 
first, the period from 1908 (when the old age non-
contributory pension was introduced in Ireland and the 
UK) until the early 1960s, at which point the contributory 
pension was introduced; second, from the early 1960s  
until the early 1980s, during which time both of the  
social welfare pensions expanded, and policy debate 
focused on the possibility of a State income-related 
pension, and; third, the period since then in which 
the current strategy evolved of attempting to develop 
occupational pensions and private pensions rather than  
a second-tier State pension.
This chapter firstly reviews the development of the state pension and then gives a brief description 
of current provisions, focusing on the relevant aggregate data and, in particular, on state pensions. 
Secondly, it gives an overview of the issues raised in the recent policy documents, notably the Green 
Paper on Pensions (GPP) and the suite of recent documents published by the Pensions Board. The 
GPP does not contain specific recommendations; it reviews pension developments to date including 
the various proposals in Securing Retirement Income (SRI), rehearses the various options for change 
summarised in the National Pensions Review (NPR), and considers the possibility of a mandatory 
private pension, already analysed in some detail in Special Savings for Retirement (SSR). Therefore, 
the analysis here adopts a thematic approach. It considers how the GPP and the other official reports 
deal with key aspects of pension reform with particular reference to gender. 
“I had no choice I want to see 
major changes in the Social 
Welfare system, those of us
who were denied voluntary 
contributions should be credited 
for all the years we spent
caring for others” 
Anna
1
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The chronology in Figure 1 below gives a thematic 
overview of pension policy developments in the last 
quarter century. These developments cannot be concisely 
understood in a strict chronology, as they reflect 
general trends and strategies at work throughout the 
period, at times overlapping and at other times with one 
development predominating. 
As the figure suggests, the construction of the social 
insurance system was a continuing pre-occupation. In 
the mid-1980s the Commission on Social Welfare gave 
the final impetus to the evolution of social insurance, 
recommending that the social security system should 
adhere broadly to a system of comprehensive social 
insurance, based on flat-rate benefits.  In the period to 
the late 1990s the implications of this policy for pensions 
unfolded. Part-time employees, public sector workers and 
the self-employed were all included in the social insurance 
contribution system. As a result, there was a growth 
over time in the proportion of the retired population in 
receipt of a social insurance pension, and of the working 
population contributing to the social insurance system.  
A second theme was the consolidation of the second 
tier of pensions, focused on supporting, regulating 
and  expanding occupational pensions. This series 
of developments emerged from the aftermath of the 
pensions debates of the late 1970s. A Green Paper 
evaluating the rationale for a second-tier state pension 
was published in 1978, and this was to be followed by a 
White Paper (Department of Social Welfare, 1977). Policy 
makers and advocates of pension developments seemed 
to abandon the prospect of substantial improvement to 
the state pension in the context of the political stability 
and unfolding economic crisis of the early to mid-1980s. 
The White Paper was drafted but never published, and the 
policy emphasis shifted in the mid-1980s to occupational 
pensions. This shift was facilitated by a political concern 
over the widely publicised failure of some occupational 
pension schemes, and the Commission on Social Welfare’s 
recommendation that the state pension should remain  
a first-tier, flat-rate benefit.
The net outcome of these developments was the 
establishment of the National Pensions Board (initially 
on an ad hoc basis and then statutorily in 1990). The 
NPB published specialist reports on issues such as the 
regulation of occupational pensions, the tax treatment 
of pensions, social insurance for the self-employed, and 
equal treatment of men and women. Legislation in the 
early 1990s gave effect to the NPB’s recommendations, 
resulting in a new regulatory framework for occupational 
pensions governing the role of trustees, funding 
standards, auditing procedures, the rights of pension 
contributors, and so on. 
Critically, in its 1993 report the NPB considered what  
the overall structure of the pension system should be.  
The Board was divided: a majority argued for a basic  
state pension combined with a voluntary, regulated 
second tier underpinned by tax allowances; a minority 
(the Trade Unions) expressed support for a compulsory 
second-tier pension, as part of either the social insurance 
or the occupational pension system (NPB, 1993;21-23). 
Briefly, the design advocated by a majority of the NPB –  
a modest, but comprehensive first tier supplemented by  
a tax-supported, regulated, voluntary second tier – has 
been implemented.
The three broad strands of policy have interacted with 
other, more general, policies to shape current provisions, 
as the lower panel in the figure shows. Poverty and 
benefit adequacy generally have featured in social policy 
discourse since the mid-1980s. A variety of analyses, 
beginning with the Commission on Social Welfare (1986), 
examined the link between relative income poverty 
and the level and structure of benefits. Over the period 
under review a number of poverty- related targets 
– some specific to pensions and some more general 
– have shaped both debate and policy. For example, the 
Commission outlined an indicative target for a minimally 
adequate benefit for the social security system as a whole, 
suggesting that social insurance pensions were then in 
the range of adequacy. In 1998 the NPB offered a target 
specifically for pensions (34% of average earnings for 
social insurance pensions) in the context of setting a first-
tier pension that would be supplemented by voluntary, 
second-tier pensions to give an income replacement  
(in total) of half average earnings.
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Figure 1: Summary of PensionPolicyThemes 1980 - 2007
Theme Key Reports  
and Documents
Examples of Policy Change  
or Initiative
Developing Comprehensive 
Social Insurance
Report of the Commission on Social 
Welfare 1986; National Pensions 
Board Report, Developing the 
National Pension System 1993
Inclusion of self employed  
and public servants in PRSI;  
broadening the range of credited 
contributions; social insurance for  
part-time Employees
Consolidating second-tier 
voluntary system
First Report of the National Pensions 
Board, 1987; National Pensions 
Board Report, The Tax Treatment of 
Occupational Pensions. 1989;
1990 Pensions Act establishing NPB  
on a statutory basis; implementation  
of NPB’s recommendations about 
funding, rights of members, equality  
of treatment, role of trustees, etc.
Increasing voluntary coverage 
- occupational and private
Report of National Pensions Board, 
Securing Retirement Income, 1998;
Report of National Pensions Board, 
National Pensions Review, 2005; 
Report of National Pensions Board, 
Special Savings for Retirement, 2006
Introduction of PRSA’s; 
Campaign to increase take-up  
of private pensions; 
Consideration of compulsory  
Second-tier pensions.
Cross-cutting Influences
Poverty-benefit adequacy
Report of NPB, Securing Retirement 
Income, 1998
Report of NPB, Special Savings for 
Retirement, 2006
Report of Commission on Social 
Welfare, 1986 and Programme for 
prosperity and Fairness, 1987
Target of 34% of average earnings for 
state social insurance pension;
State pension at 40% of average  
earnings in the context of mandatory 
private, second-tier pension;
Adoption of targets for benefit levels  
and priorities for increases.
Gender
1979 Equal Treatment Directive
1993 Report of Second Commission 
on Status of Women
Equalisation of dependency status  
of men and women; equal rights for 
women in occupational persons; 
Introduction of social insurance  
credits for home based care.
Gender was also a key influence on policy and provisions. 
The proximate source of this influence was the EU’s Equal 
Treatment Directive of 1979 and its implementation 
in Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s. In giving effect to 
the Directive, Ireland altered the level and structure 
of pensions and other benefits, redefined the nature 
of dependency in the benefit system as a whole, and 
removed formal gender discrimination from occupational 
pensions. Aside from these formal changes, however, the 
equal treatment debate both reflected and reinforced 
concerns articulated in feminist critiques of social 
security about the ‘male breadwinner’ character of the 
social security system and continued structural but 
indirect discrimination. In turn, this led to some degree of 
individualisation of state pensions and some recognition 
of caring roles in the social insurance contribution system. 
The latter issues are dealt with more fully below. 
In summary, the Irish pension system now comprises a 
suite of state pensions that is increasingly comprehensive 
in coverage, offering a modest level of pensions relative 
to average incomes. This is complemented by a tax-
subsidised, voluntary second tier covering approximately 
half of the labour force. An important qualification to 
this description is the separate treatment of established 
public servants who belong to occupational defined 
benefit pension schemes (some of these employees have 
occupational pensions that are integrated with the state 
pension). As the review of pension systems in OECD 
countries in chapter 2 suggests, pensions in Ireland  
belong to a particular pension regime.
Current Provisions – an Overview
Table 1 gives some key aggregate data in relation to state 
old age pensions: these data summarise some important 
trends that bear directly on future pension policy. As the 
first row of the table shows, the share of the elderly in 
the population has been stable in the last decade – in fact, 
it declined slightly. To the extent that concerns about 
the costs and sustainability of pensions are informed by 
demographic ageing, it is clear that the Irish pension 
system does not face such a challenge in the immediate or 
near future. Rows 2-4 of the table summarise the detailed 
trends shown in Chart 1 and indicate the increasing 
maturity of the social insurance system. Over the decade 
to 2006 the number of insurance-based pensions increased 
significantly and the number of social assistance (means-
tested) pensions fell. Social insurance pensions now 
comprise in excess of 70% of state old age pensions. 
Rows 6 and 7 measure state pension coverage: in 2006 over 
two thirds of the aged population received a state pension, 
a figure that reflects significant growth over the decade. If 
the coverage is measured to include adult dependants, the 
figure increases to 80%. The final row in Table 1 records a 
small decline in total expenditure on state pensions as a 
percent of GNP – an important figure that highlights the 
sustainability of state pensions. The decline arises from 
a combination of two trends: a stable share of the elderly 
in the population and a decline over the period in the 
state pension relative to GNP per capita. In considering 
the lessons of other countries’ pension reforms and their 
preoccupation with costs and sustainability, it is important 
to note the contrast between Ireland and many other 
countries to date: in Ireland, a stable share of the elderly  
in the population and a fall in the cost of state pensions.
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Chart 1. Insurance and Assistance Pensions, 1996-2006
Source: Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs; Central Statistics Office.
Notes: The figures in each column are not all for the same year; ‘Dependants’ refer to adult dependants only;  
 adult dependants’ payments are not conditional on the dependant being of pension age.
Table 1. Trends in Old Age Pensions 1996-2006
Pensions 1996c. 2006c. Change
1. Pop. 65+ as % of Total Pop. 11.4 11.2 -0.2
2. Social Insurance (000s) 134.9 215.7 +80.8
3. Social Assistance (000s) 103.0 84.5 -18.5
4. Total State Pensions (000s) 237.9 300.2 +62.3
5. Insurance pensions as % of total 56.7 71.9 +14.2
6. Total as % of Pop. 65+ 57.5 66.6 +9.1
7. Total + Dependants as % of Pop. 65+ 68.7 79.7 +9.0
8. Pensions Expenditure as % of GNP 2.5 2.1 -0.4
Insurance Assistance Total
00
0s
Year
Turning from trends in the number of pensions to the 
incomes of the elderly, the first point to note is the 
concentration of the elderly in the lower reaches of the 
income distribution. As Table 3 shows, this is quite marked 
in Ireland. In 2006, 63% of the elderly were in the lowest 
two quintiles compared with 35% for persons aged 15-64. 
These figures highlight the financial vulnerability of the 
older population.
In these circumstances, the value of the state pension 
relative to average income – and to a poverty line based 
on a per cent of average income – is critically important 
in determining the level of financial poverty among the 
elderly. The detailed data in Table 4, summarised in Chart 
2, highlight this point. When the state pension exceeded 
the poverty line in 1994, pensioner poverty was in single 
digit figures. In subsequent years, as average incomes 
rose and the poverty line rose in tandem, pension levels 
did not increase as rapidly. As the figures show, the gap 
between the poverty line widened and the rate of poverty 
among the elderly increased sharply. After 2001, when the 
rate of income growth receded and budgetary increases in 
pensions (relative to incomes) were enhanced, this trend 
was reversed. In the period since 2001 the elderly poverty 
rate has fallen and in 2006 stood at 13.6 per cent; because 
of the relative increases in pensions, pensioner poverty 
is now less than the overall poverty rate. In the context 
of pension policy, the important point about these data is 
that the poverty rate among the elderly is very strongly 
determined by the relative level of the state pension. This 
is because pensioners in general are in the lower ranges 
of the income distribution and rely heavily on the state 
pension: this applies in particular to women. 
Table 3. Percentage distribution of different age groups in the population by income quintile, 2006
Quintile* Age 0-14 Age 15-64 Age 65+
% Cumulative % Cumulative % Cumulative
1 23.2 23.2 18.7 18.7 22.2 22.2
2 20.2 43.4 16.6 35.2 40.6 62.8.
3 22.6 66.0 20.1 55.3 15.0 77.8.
4 18.9 84.9 21.3 76.6 13.7 91.5
5 15.1 100 23.3 100 8.6 100.
Source: Statistical Information on Social Welfare Services 2006,
Table 2. State Old Age Pensions among the Male and Female Population, 2006
Population – Pensions Males Females All
Payments for
Spouses/Partners 
000s
Total Population 000s 207.1 260.8 467.9 –
Insurance pensions 000s 155.2 75.6 230.8 58.5
Assistance pensions 000s 35.5 48.9 84.5 3.0
Total Pensions 000s 190.7 124.5 315.3 61.5
(a) % of Population with insurance pension 74.9 29.0 49.3 –
(b) % of Population with assistance pension 17.1 18.8 18.1 –
(a+b) Total % 92.0 47.8 67.4 –
* A quintile is a one-fifth share of the distribution; quintiles are  
 ranked here from the lowest onefifth of incomes (quintile 1)  
 to the highest (quintile 5).
Source: EU- SILC 2006, Central Statistics Office
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Table 4. Trends in Pensioner Poverty, Selected Years
Poverty 1994 1997 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
1. Poverty line*
 (1 weekly)
98.60 125.54 139.45 165.66 187.84 185.28 185.51 192.74 202.49
2. % of persons  
 poor
15.6 18.2 22.6 23.7 21.9 19.7 19.4 18.5 17.0
3. % of older** 
 poor
5.9 24.2 32.9 38.4 44.1 36.4 27.1 20.1 13.6
4. State pension***
 (1 weekly)
90.17 99.06 105.41 121.92 134.59 157.30 167.30 179.30 193.30
5. Poverty gap
 (1 weekly) [1 - 4]
-8.43 -26.48 - 34.04 43.74 -53.25 -27.98 -18.21 -13.44 -9.19
* The poverty line is 60 per cent of median equivalised disposable  
 income per week for 2003 to 2006 and 60 per cent of mean  
 income for 1994 to 2001 and the figures are therefore not  
 strictly comparable.
** Older people refers to persons aged 65 years and over.
***The state pension level refers to the OACP payment for  
 one adult.
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Chart 2. Pensions and Poverty Rates
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In relation to gender differences in poverty rates, EU-SILC 
data differentiated by gender shows a slightly higher risk 
of poverty among older women than among men – for 
example, 28% for women and 25% for men in 2004. Again 
reflecting recent budgetary increases in pensions which 
have a greater effect on the incomes of women, the gender 
differential in poverty rates had disappeared by 2006. 
The differential poverty rates for older men and women 
arise in part from differences in the composition of 
their income. A recent analysis of the Household Budget 
Survey for 1999/2000 confirms both the reliance of the 
older population on the state pension and the greater 
reliance among women. Table 5 below (referring only to 
older persons living alone) shows that the highest level of 
dependence on all forms of pension income is among older 
women: the figure here is 85 %. Social welfare pensions 
comprise the bulk of this income. The difference between 
the genders is striking: for men aged 75+ the state pension 
is 43% of total income, compared with 59% for women.
The analysis to this point has focused on the pensioner 
population, but it is equally important to note the key 
gender difference among the current workforce in 
relation to pensions. There is differential participation 
in second-tier schemes among men and women. Table 6 
above summarises some key data.
The figures for 1995 and 2002 are not directly comparable: 
in its comment on the data the Green Paper cautions 
against seeing a rise over time in pension coverage. 
However, the 2002/5 data are comparable and they 
span the time period in which the Pensions Board has 
been attempting to increase coverage by means of the 
voluntary PRSA initiative. The figures are indicative 
of a rise in the coverage rate but with a persistent and 
marked difference between men and women. There are no 
published data by sector, occupation, employment status, 
income, and other variables that reveal the sources of the 
male/female differential. The sectoral details shown in the 
CSO’s survey show a definite pattern related to gender; 
sectors with high concentrations of female employees 
have very low coverage – for example, only 10% in Hotels 
and Restaurants and 29% in Services. There are also 
gender differences in pension behaviour. A CSO (2006) 
survey about reasons for lack of pension coverage elicited 
the responses summarised in Table 7. For both men and 
women the most common reason is ‘never got around to 
organising it’. However, affordability is also important; it 
is given as a reason by a higher per cent of women then 
men. Higher proportions of women than men expect their 
spouse’s pension to cover them: likewise, women are more 
likely than men to state that there is no pension scheme 
available to them in work.
Finally, in relation to gender patterns in savings and 
pensions behaviour, the data in relation to the Special 
Savings Investment Accounts (SSIAs) should be noted.  
The official figures show that proportionately more men 
than women invested in these savings and that the  
average subscription per person was lower for women 
than men: the average subscription for women was 85%  
of that for men. 
Before turning to the question of pension reform in the 
next section, it is important to address the underlying 
factors that affect current and future differences in 
men’s and women’s pensions. Clearly, past and current 
differences are related to gender differentiation in 
employment and related matters. However, the question 
for pension reform is whether or not these differences 
remain so substantial that they will translate into 
gender inequalities in pensions in the future. One line of 
reasoning here argues that gender equality in these areas 
will diminish over time and that greater pension equity 
will result from the recent and prospective reduction in 
employment-related inequalities. The empirical basis for 
this reasoning is the suite of gender policies introduced in 
the last two decades and the outcome of these policies in 
the form of rising female participation rates. An analysis 
along these lines points typically to the growth in female 
labour force participation and, specifically, to the  
doubling of married women’s employment participation 
in the last decade or so. The implication here for pension 
reform is that policy changes that strengthen the link 
Table 5. Sources of Income (Per cent) for Retired Persons living alone, 1999-2000
Age/Gender Pension Income/
Total
State Employment
Pension/Total
Other Employment
Pension/Total
State Pension/
Total
Males 65-74 66.7 11.6 12.6 42.4
Males 75+ 77.7 23.0 11.5 43.1
Females 65-74 78.0 12.7 14.5 51.0
Females 75+ 84.0 10.7 14.3 59.0
Table 6. Coverage rates for second-tier pensions, selected years
Population 1995 2002 2005 Official
% % % Target
Male 49 56 58 59
Female 40 45 51 61
All 46 51 55 60
Source: Stewart (2005) based on Household Budget Survey 1999-2000.
Source: Green Paper (2007) based on ESRI 1995 survey and CSO 
Quarterly National Household Surveys, Q1 2002 and Q1 2005
Table 7.
Per cent Distribution of Reasons for Men and Women not having a (supplementary) 
Reason for lack of coverage Men Women
Never got around to organising it 34.1 30.7
Don’t understand pensions 3.5 3.3
Can’t afford pensions 24.6 29.5
Can’t access pension prior to retirement 1.2 0.6
No scheme available through work 7.3 9.6
Other source of income adequate 5.7 4.3
Spouse/partner has good pension 0.7 4.6
Other 14.6 10.5
Don’t know 8.4 6.9
Total 100 100
Source: CSO (2006)
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between pensions and the employment experience  
would be equitable because of the achievement of 
substantially greater equality between men and women  
in the labour market.
There are a number of points to be noted here. First, 
some of the recent increase in female participation 
may simply reflect the boom conditions in the Celtic 
Tiger labour market and may not be a good guide to 
future trends. Second, the narrative of growing gender 
equality usually invokes evidence about labour market 
participation rates for aggregates such as ‘females’ or 
‘married females’. However, the critical issue is whether 
women’s work participation and earnings are affected by 
– and will continue to be affected by – interruptions due 
to childbirth, child care and family care responsibilities: 
accordingly, past and future maternal employment rates 
are more relevant for understanding past trends and 
considering future policies. The indicators in Table 8, 
drawn from the Men and Women in Ireland compilation  
and other sources (CSO, 2006) indicate continuing  
gender inequalities. 
The first rows of the table show that when adults without 
children are compared there are no gender differences 
in employment participation. However, when the 
comparison is confined to prime age adults with young 
children, maternal employment rates are substantially 
lower than the rates for men and this continues to be the 
case with children at later ages (data not shown). Among 
married adults the extent of part-time work is markedly 
higher among women than men. Earnings differences also 
persist: the average wage covered for social insurance is 
higher for men and so too is the hourly industrial earnings 
figure. These comparisons also need to be viewed in 
the context of women’s greater responsibilities for care 
work. A simple count of the number of recipients of the 
state payments to carers highlights the preponderance 
of female carers. When the Census (self-reported) figures 
for the number of carers, and the proportions giving 43 or 
more hours of care weekly are considered, the higher rate 
of care giving among women is very clear.
These data give only a very summary picture of a well-
established body of work that repeatedly shows that, 
whatever the extent of formal equality between men and 
women, there are persisting differences between the male 
and female life course. Men are more closely tied to the 
nexus of paid employment than women – and to the rights 
associated with paid employment – and they are better 
rewarded for their paid employment. Women, however, 
continue to express their commitment to paid work in a 
context shaped by the contingencies of childbirth, child 
care and family care work. If pension reform in Ireland 
links the pension system as a whole more strongly to paid 
work, then reform will reinforce economic differences in 
old age between men and women. 
Issues in Pension Reform
Against the background outlined above, a number of 
important themes in recent pension debate should be 
addressed at this point. The policy documents published  
by the Pensions Board and the recent Green Paper  
together offer both strategic analyses and very detailed 
data and recommendations that span the entire spectrum 
of public and private pensions. Here, without attempting 
to touch on the detail, the key inter-related issues that 
have implications in particular for women are noted, and 
in Chapter Four the views of the NWCI on these questions 
are elaborated.
Adequacy. Since the report of the Commission on Social 
Welfare in 1986, and all through the recent era of rising 
incomes and high relative income poverty, the question 
of the adequacy of the state pension (and state benefits 
in general) and its role in relation to income poverty 
has been contentious. In the context of the more recent 
Pensions Board reports (Pensions Board, 1998; Pensions 
Board, 2005), attention has focused on a target for the 
state pension at 34% of average earnings. The analysis 
outlined above highlights the possibility of other targets. 
The published EU SILC data, for example, would allow 
pension levels to be benchmarked against an explicit 
poverty target based on fully representative income data. 
Pension adequacy is particularly relevant to those older 
people more reliant on state pensions – women. 
The NWCI observes that the debate about pensions and 
poverty has been framed wholly in terms of the amount 
of the pension, while for women the question of the unit 
of entitlement and of direct personal access to pension 
income is of equal importance. 
Structure. Since the publication of the National Pensions 
Board’s final report in 1993, and throughout during the 
last decade, the persistent question about pension reform 
is whether or not the overall pension regime should adopt 
a second, comprehensive tier, and if so, how. The thrust 
of policy reform has been as follows: that there should be 
a second tier, that it should remain voluntary (for both 
individual private pensions and occupational pensions) 
and that it should be ‘grown’ by means of encouragement, 
public education, and tax incentives. There has been 
little recent attention to, or argument in favour of, a 
compulsory, state second tier. 
Of course, there is a link between the issues of structure 
and adequacy. The need for, or the role of a second-
tier pension depends in part on the adequacy and 
comprehensiveness of the first-tier, state pension. If the 
latter is universal and generous the rationale for a second-
tier pension is less clear. (The NPR analysis, for example, 
offers detailed data on the cost and other implications 
of setting the state pension at 50% of average earnings). 
There is also an inter-generational aspect to the first-tier/
second-tier link: improvements in the first tier will affect 
the current cohort of pensioners, while the introduction 
of a new second-tier will benefit future pensioners
Critically, none of the official analyses look at the 
question of a second tier from a gender perspective. As 
a generalisation, second-tier pensions are more closely 
tied to employment experience and contributions. 
From a gender stance, therefore, the first question is 
whether a second -tier reform is more of a priority than 
an improvement in the first tier. NWCI argues that the 
overriding priority is to improve the state pension. 
The second issue is what form any newly introduced 
second-tier pension might take. NWCI notes that the 
recent emphasis on voluntary, tax-subsidised PRSAs has 
not resulted in a substantial improvement in coverage, 
and the achieved improvement required tax incentives. 
Furthermore, PRSAs tie supplementary pension income 
directly to individuals’ capacity to contribute to a fund, 
and this system will be of more benefit to men than 
women. Therefore, PRSAs should not continue to be the 
core of a new second tier. For related reasons, NWCI would 
also repudiate the option of a mandatory private pension 
discussed in Special Savings for Retirement. Mandatory 
Table 8. 
Summary Indicators of Gender Differences in Employment, Income and Care, Ireland, 2006c.
Employment Indicators Males Females
% Participation rate all married persons 15+ 77.1 53.0
% Participation rate adults 20 - 44, no children 86.5 84.8
% Participation rate adults 20- 44 , youngest child 0-3 91.3 55.3
% Married adults in employment working part-time 4.3 41.8
Income Indicators
Average industrial earnings 1 hourly 15.22 12.32
Average insurable earnings 1 000s p.a. 27.1 17.8
Care work Indicators
No. of recipients of Carer’s Benefit/Allowance (000s) 4.9 21.0
No. of Carers per 1,000 in Working Age Groups 41.5 73.4
% of Carers providing 43 + hours weekly 21.2 25.0
Source: Women and Men in Ireland, CSO; Census 2006
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private pensions would also tie prospective pension 
income to employment and, like PRSAs, would rest the 
pension risk on the individual, while still mandating 
each worker to contribute a percent of earnings. For 
low income workers (many of whom are women) this 
mandated contribution could, in effect, compound the 
workings of PRSI, income tax and means-tested benefits 
and create poverty traps and disincentives.
This all suggests that if a second-tier pension is to 
be introduced it should be a state system. Such an 
arrangement could build on the long-established and 
widely accepted social insurance system and could 
incorporate design features that recognise the differential 
positions of men and women in the labour market. If a 
state second-tier pension were introduced in the context 
of a comprehensive pension guarantee at first tier, it 
would give the state and society two tiers of pension 
provision in which policy objectives might be advanced. 
One strategic limitation of the current state pension is 
that one tier of provision carries the burden of achieving 
a wide range of implicit and explicit objectives: poverty 
alleviation, income distribution, income replacement and 
gender equality, amongst others. 
Sustainability. The Green Paper and the Pensions  
Board documents reflect the international pre-occupation 
with the ‘crisis of ageing’. These documents show that 
in many countries the combination of generous income 
replacement, low retirement ages, low economic growth 
and a rising share of the elderly in the population have all 
contrived to create a sharp increase in pension spending 
relative to GNP. For instance, the ratio of pension spending 
to GNP (survivors’ pensions included) in 2003 was in the 
range 12 % to 14% for Austria, Italy, Germany, France and 
Greece. All of these countries have mature pension systems 
with low retirement ages, moderate to high replacement 
ratios, and elderly dependency ratios already in excess  
of 20%.
It is important to stress that the demographic and policy 
scenarios in these countries are not relevant to Ireland. 
In Ireland the share of the elderly in the population is 
still low by international standards, the eligibility age for 
pensions is high at 65/66 and has remained unchanged 
since the late 1970s, and the ratio of the state pension 
relative to average incomes is low. This is all reflected in 
the exceptionally low figure for public spending on old  
age pensions in Ireland – approximately 2.5% of GNP. 
The Green Paper (Green Paper, 2007:30) concludes 
from its analysis that ‘the existing system is simply 
not sustainable’. However, this interpretation of the 
demographic and other evidence is unduly pessimistic. 
It is clear, on the one hand, that pension costs will rise 
in Ireland as the population ages. In Ireland this process 
will commence around 2011, and will result in a gradual 
increase in the numbers of older persons in the population 
and a fall in the ratio of workers to pensioners. From 2006 
to 2031 the share of older persons in the population will 
rise from 11% to 18% and the ratio of those in working age 
to those over 65 will fall from 5.6 to 3.3. This demographic 
shift will impart upward pressure on public spending on 
pensions. The Green Paper cites a number of estimates 
of future spending, all pointing to a gradual increase: for 
example, the National Pensions Review estimated that the 
cost of all first-tier pensions will increase from around 3% 
of GNP currently to 4.9 % in 2026 and 6.5% in 2036.
In this context NWCI stresses that, while the pension 
system must adapt to the evolving population, the 
current and medium-term scenario in Ireland is distinctly 
sustainable by international standards. Therefore, because 
the demographic context in Ireland differs and because 
pension provisions have been more generous elsewhere, 
some of the adjustments contemplated or implemented 
elsewhere are not relevant to Ireland. For example, 
the replacement ratio is already low and the pension 
eligibility age is already fixed at the conventional 65/66. 
Two broad analytical issues feature in the international 
debate on sustainability: one is whether pensions should 
be funded on a Pay as you Go basis (with current taxes and 
contributions paying for current pensions in payment) 
or on a funded basis (with past savings and contributions 
determining the level of pensions expenditure). The 
international research on this topic is complex and 
contentious. NWCI notes that the most recent academic 
synthesis of this work argues that funding per se is 
not inherently superior to PAYG and does not of itself 
address demographic ageing (Barr, 2001). The second, 
related point concerns the relative sizes of the working 
and retired populations. On this point the analytical 
work is unambiguous: increasing the size of the labour 
force (and also, of course, improving the productivity of 
the workforce) is an appropriate response to population 
ageing, and increasing the retirement age is one means by 
which this strategy can be pursued. 
From a gender perspective it is important to stress that 
increasing female labour force participation is another 
means by which the labour force can be enlarged. 
Therefore, pension sustainability de facto requires policies 
that maximise female and maternal employment rates and 
simultaneously facilitate employment and parenthood 
for men and women. The centrality of increased female 
labour market participation to the sustainability of 
pensions is underpinned in the pension policy of the 
EU (Council of the European Union, December 2001). 
Tuominen and Laitinen Kuikka (2003) and Sarfati (2003:6) 
strongly argue for ‘the prime importance of increasing 
employment rates of women’ and suggest that:
 
an efficiently functioning labour market, with high 
participation rates and two-way mobility between 
activity and inactivity, part-time and full-time work, 
training and socially useful activities, may be 
even more important than the age structure of the 
population in guaranteeing the long-term sustainability 
of today’s welfare state and ensuring decent living 
standards and social cohesion to the population.
The Green Paper discusses the option of increasing the 
retirement age. NWCI recognises that the concept of 
the ‘working age’, is, like gender, a socially constructed 
concept. Cousins (2005) observes how over the 20th 
Century the concept of working age has increased at the 
younger end and decreased at the older end of the age 
spectrum. Given higher life expectancy and different 
expectations, it is reasonable to expect that at least some 
older people will want greater choice and flexibility about 
when and how they retire. 
The sustainability challenge for policy makers and for the 
NWCI is to ensure that the specific employment policies 
pursued do not lower fertility and thereby exacerbate 
population aging in the long run. It is also important to 
note a point neglected in the Green Paper and elsewhere. 
Pensions (at an individual and macro level) are not merely 
an outcome of employment: they can also be an incentive 
for employment participation. Improved pensions for 
individual women may be an instrument to sustain the 
size of the working population.
Equity. This issue relates to the socio-economic 
redistribution of the costs and benefits of the pension 
system. From a gender standpoint two specific points arise 
here. The current state pension system is, in an arithmetic 
sense, redistributive, with lower paid employees and 
women experiencing higher rates of return and higher 
replacement rates. This reflects the flat-rate benefit 
system, the contribution structure, differential life 
expectancy and other factors. However, it also reinforces 
the potential of an enhanced state pension to achieve 
greater redistribution. 
The second-tier pension system, however, is not 
redistributive either in coverage or financing. Coverage 
is lower among women and other low-paid employees, 
and detailed analysis has shown that the substantial fiscal 
cost through tax relief disproportionately benefits higher 
income groups. 
In the context of pension reforms for the future,  
a critical question arises about the balance between  
the costs of a tax-subsidised second tier and a more 
generous, comprehensive, first tier, and this question  
has added significance because of the relative size of  
the tax expenditures and state pensions spending. In 
Ireland, the Green Paper records a figure for 2006 of €2.9 
billions as the net cost of tax reliefs, broadly defined. 
Remarkably, the figure for state pensions (including the 
Pre-Retirement Allowance) in 2006 is €2.9 billions: the 
figures are identical. This brings policy choices and trade-
offs into sharp relief. New Zealand’s ‘woman friendly’ 
pension (see Chapter 2) based on an adequate, universal 
pension was affordable precisely because the voluntary 
second-tier was not underpinned by tax allowances, and 
the cost of tax allowances were viewed by policy makers  
as the equivalent of direct public expenditures. 
The significance of this issue is clearly highlighted in the 
recent study of pension reform options (Callan, 2007). This 
study used a tax-benefit model to simulate and quantify 
the impact of altering the tax treatment of pensions: 
specifically, the study evaluated the distributional impact 
of allowing the current tax reliefs at the standard rate 
only and increasing the state pension by €50 per week. For 
4 These comments summarise very detailed financial calculations by the OECD in its comprehensive survey of countries’ pensions systems (OECD, 2007).
5 There is some disagreement as to whether the budgetary costs of tax reliefs, ‘tax expenditures’ so called, can be viewed as the equivalent of direct state expenditure on 
 pensions. The Pensions Board’s reports and the Green Paper reject the conventional analysis that the cost of tax reliefs are the analytical equivalent of state spending.
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NWCI the salient findings are that the lowest deciles of the 
income distribution gain and the higher deciles lose: there 
is a significant net redistribution. Strikingly, the reform 
would substantially reduce relative income poverty: at 
the 60% of median income poverty line the poverty rate 
among the older population would be a mere 1.3%. The 
author concludes that this specific reform ‘would virtually 
eliminate the risk of income poverty for older people’ 
(Callan, 2007: 41). 
NWCI is not advocating the specific reform referred 
to here. The critical point is that whatever the merits 
of viewing the tax expenditures as the equivalent of 
direct expenditure, and whatever the ‘knock-on’ effects 
of restricting tax reliefs, the sheer cost of the reliefs, 
makes it imperative to consider the alternatives, and 
in particular to evaluate the impact on poverty rates of 
redirecting the resources foregone through tax reliefs.
Individualisation. Although not a central theme of  
any mainstream pension discussion, there has been  
some treatment of individualisation and individual 
entitlement in two recent social partnership working 
groups concerning Administrative Individualisation  
(DSFA 2003) and Modernising the Social Insurance System. 
This reflects a political commitment contained in 2002 
and 2007 Programmes for Government to introduce full 
administrative individualisation for pensions. While it 
is a limited reform, the NWCI have welcomed this while 
pursuing a fuller individualisation agenda. 
Governance. All pension systems, public and private, 
voluntary and mandatory, require governance 
arrangements that enable transparent and accountable 
management and high levels of public acceptability and 
legitimacy. There are gender and antipoverty dimensions 
to pensions governance that are not currently reflected 
in policy-making forums, and a neglected aspect of the 
reform debate is how and in what institutional context the 
reform options are elaborated and debated.  
The general themes outlined above do not offer a specific 
agenda for pension reform for NWCI; they have to be set in 
the context of a feminist framework for pension analysis. 
This is given in Chapter 3.
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2 CHAPTER TWO
The Irish Pension System in International Context
Ireland in Comparative Context -  
Pensions in OECD Countries
Figure 2, based on the OECD’s recent compilation6, 
summarises the structure of pensions in OECD countries. 
In the context of this study a number of aspects of these 
comparisons merit comment. All of the countries have 
some form of first-tier pension, but there is considerable 
variety in the structure of these provisions which 
are designed to alleviate poverty. The most common 
element in the first-tier is the resource-tested pension, 
where pensioners’ total resources (income or assets or a 
combination of these) are brought up to a threshold. Some 
countries do this as part of a general social assistance 
programme and others, Ireland included, by way of a 
specific resource-tested programme for pensioners.  
Only two countries rely wholly on such schemes at the 
first tier. 
Basic pensions are in place in thirteen countries. These 
pensions are flat-rate in the sense that the pensions are 
not based on past earnings and usually (as in the case 
of Ireland) reflect number of years at work: additional 
income does not alter the value of the basic pension. The 
flat-rate aspect of basic pensions imparts an indirectly 
redistributive profile in this, arithmetic, sense; lower paid 
workers have higher replacement rates, but of course a 
higher replacement rate might co-exist with a low level  
of basic pension. 
At first tier, Ireland is unexceptional: it combines a 
resource-tested pension (the Non-contributory Old Age 
Pension) combined with a basic pension (the Contributory 
Old Age Pension). This combination applies to four 
countries. It is important to note, however, that six 
countries use only a minimum pension and a further 
eight combine these with other first-tier pensions. Like 
resource- tested, first-tier pensions, these minima are 
designed to ensure that pensions do not fall below a 
threshold; however, they only take account of pension 
income and are not affected by non-pension income or 
assets. In the context of pension reform debate in Ireland, 
it is useful to observe that resource-tested pensions 
are not inherently necessary to the construction of an 
effective first tier.
 
Turning to the second tier, Ireland and New Zealand 
are the only two countries that do not have mandatory 
provisions, either public or private, which add an income 
replacement function on top of the first tier7. It can also 
be seen that the majority of the countries recorded in the 
table have Defined Benefit (DB) pensions at the second 
tier, i.e. pensions set as a fraction of earnings. In these 
This chapter places the Irish system in context with a brief overview of pensions in OECD countries.  
It distils some relevant lessons from international experience for future policy in Ireland, focusing  
on the gender aspects of pension reform.
6 See OECD (2007) Pensions at a Glance. Public Policies across OECD Countries. Paris: OECD
7 In fact New Zealand introduced Kiwi Saver in 2007. This is a mandatory private pension along defined contribution lines: it operates on ‘auto-enrolment’ principles  
 in which employees are automatically enrolled and then allowed the option of leaving the scheme. As it has just been introduced, it is not yet in payment among the  
 retired population.
“I am now seventy years of 
age and have received nothing 
from the state even though I 
have contributed to society by 
rearing the future generation.”
Catherine
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arrangements pension income is a function of the number 
of years’ contributions and a measure of earnings. The 
‘points’ schemes in France, Germany, Norway and Slovak 
Republic are a variant on the standard DB scheme: in 
points systems workers earn pension points based on their 
individual earnings for each year of contribution, and at 
retirement the points are multiplied by a pension point 
value to convert them into a pension. 
At the second tier, the most common system after DB is 
Defined Contribution (DC). In DC plans the pension income 
depends on the amount of the contributions into an 
individual account and the returns on investment funds, 
with the financial risk falling on the individual pensioner. 
In Australia, which has the most widely cited mandatory 
DC scheme, employers are required to contribute on 
behalf of workers. In three other countries with broadly 
similar schemes (Poland, Mexico, and Hungary) workers 
select  
a pension provider without employers’ involvement.  
A relatively new variant on the DC system is the Notional 
Defined Account (NDC) introduced in Italy and Sweden 
specifically to inject a contributory element into their 
state-funded Pay-as-You-Go system. These schemes record 
each worker’s contributions in an individual account and 
apply a rate of return; the accumulated capital in each 
separate account is converted at retirement into a pension 
by applying a formula based on life expectancy. (As the 
contributions and the interest applied exist only on the 
books of the fund managing institution, these accounts  
are notional).
Viewed in broad terms, two general points arise from the 
detailed comparisons. First, in focusing on the need to 
construct a second-tier pension, policy makers in Ireland 
are correctly redressing a deficit in its pension system 
that only one other country retains. Second, the emphasis 
on voluntary, second-tier pensions in the Pensions Board’s 
reports and policies is striking in the light of the sheer 
variety of pension regimes in other countries from which 
Ireland might have much to learn. 
The comparative details noted above describe the 
structure of the countries’ pension systems, but these 
details need to be viewed in the light of important 
parameters and design features of the pension system. 
Selected relevant data for the OECD area are given in 
Figure 3, and these data place Ireland in sharp focus. 
The replacement rate figures refer to all mandatory 
pensions: in Ireland at average earnings the rate is at the 
very low end of the international spectrum; this applies 
whether gross or net measures are used (pension wealth 
simulations not shown in the table convey a similar 
pattern). The data on pension age also makes Ireland 
something of an outlier: while the expected retirement 
age is 65 in Ireland, in the state pension system the age 
is 66 for both the Contributory and Non Contributory 
pension. Nor is there any scope to acquire these pensions 
at a lower age, for either men or women. Taken together 
with the structural characteristics, these comparisons 
show that Ireland’s pension system is undeveloped, and 
detailed contrasts with GNP or similar measures would 
not highlight national income as the source of Ireland’s 
relative pension status.
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Figure 2. Structure of Pension Systems in OECD countries
Country
First tier Second-tier,  
Mandatory/insurance
Universal, redistributive Public Private
Resource-
based
Basic Minimum Type Type
Australia * DC
Austria * DB
Belgium * DB
Canada * * DB
Czech Republic * * DB
Denmark * * DC
Finland * DB
France * * DB +points
Germany * points
Greece * * DB
Hungary DB DC
Iceland * * DB
Ireland * *
Italy * NDC
Japan * DB
Korea * DB
Luxembourg * * * DB
Mexico * * DC
Netherlands * DB
New Zealand *
Norway * * Points DC
Poland * NDC DC
Portugal * DB
Slovak Republic * Points DC
Spain * DB
Sweden * NDC DB+DC
Switzerland * * DB DB
Turkey * DB
UK * * * DB
USA * DB
DB = defined benefit; DC = defined contribution;  
NDC = notional accounts.
Source: OECD 2007
Pension Reform in OECD Countries
Since the early 1990s there has  been a wave of reform 
of both public and private pension provisions, reflecting 
in some cases very specific concerns about costs and 
sustainability and in other cases (similar to Ireland) 
concerns about constructing and developing the pension 
system. As a precursor to the comparative analysis of 
Ireland in the next section, the following paragraphs 
outline the mechanisms of reform adopted across 
countries, as recorded in the OECD’s summary.
Increased pension eligibility age:  
In three countries the age is already 67 and three  
other countries are legislating for increases. The most 
common gender-related pattern is for age increases 
affecting men and women equally – seven countries –  
and in four countries the equalisation is being effected 
through removing lower pension ages for women. As  
the OECD observes, age increases may be justified on cost 
and sustainability grounds, but they may affect lower 
income retirees who are more susceptible to earlier  
forced retirement because of unemployment or illness.
Improved rewards for remaining in work:  
There has been a very widespread shift towards  
restricting early retirement pensions and to actively 
creating incentives to remain in work. For example, 
in Australia a lump sum bonus was introduced as an 
inducement to stay in the workforce, and in Finland older 
workers are now given higher accrual rates than younger 
workers. These changes improve sustainability and 
arguably improve equity as between workers retiring at 
different ages – this could also, indirectly, reduce pension 
inequalities between higher and lower-paid workers.
Changes in the link between earnings and benefits:  
The most common pattern historically was to link  
pensions to immediate pre-retirement earnings or to 
the ‘best’ years of earnings. Many countries are now 
using longer earnings periods or shifting to measures 
of lifetime earnings. Austria is committed to moving 
the averaging period to 40 years and Finland, Poland, 
Sweden and Portugal are moving to a measure of lifetime 
average earnings. These kinds of changes will improve 
sustainability and have complex social effects – the latter 
are dependent on the lifetime work and earnings profiles 
of different categories of workers. It is distinctly possible 
that women may lose relative to men because of their 
particular lifetime work participation profile.
Changes in the revaluation of past earnings: 
In many earnings-related pensions past earnings are re-
valued to reflect changes in living standards over time. 
However, the established pattern of re-valuation in line 
with economic growth is now giving way to re-valuation 
based on prices. France implemented this reform in the 
1990s and several other countries have modified their re-
valuation systems to a mixture of prices and wage growth. 
This shift has the potential to improve sustainability, but 
will tend to reduce average pension benefits; here too the 
social effects are complex and depend on workers’ age-
earnings profiles.
Linking pensions to life expectancy: 
Some countries have added DC schemes to their pensions 
system or (as in the case of Mexico) substituted one for 
a public system. DC plans usually entail the conversion 
of the fund to an annuity; this automatically links the 
annuity to life expectancy. While DC plans represent a 
structural mechanism in the pension system as a whole, 
other, more common – and less visible – methods of 
implementing this change include: establishing a link 
between average life expectancy and eligible pension 
age (Denmark); linking life expectancy to the number of 
contribution years required to get a full pension; adjusting 
the value of pensions to life expectancy at retirement 
(Finland and Portugal).
Changes in the indexation of pensions in payment: 
There is a general drift away from indexation of current 
pensions to earnings towards indexation based wholly 
or partially on prices. Italy, for example, indexes lower 
pensions to prices and higher pensions to a percentage  
of price inflation; Austria indexes pensions to prices only 
up to a ceiling. In the last decade too there are instances  
of countries temporarily abandoning their indexing 
regime, in Germany on three occasions prior to 2004, 
and also in the US and Belgium. Of course, this change 
improves the financial sustainability of pension systems, 
but, as the OECD observed, it may challenge their social 
and political sustainability. 
Pre-funding of public pensions: The pension systems 
that faced the more serious sustainability challenges 
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Figure 3. Selected Pension Scheme Parameters in OECD countries
Country
Scheme Parameters
Gross
Replacement
Rate – age
25 at entry
Gross
Replacement
rate
Net
Replacement
rate
Normal
Pension
Age
Early
pension
Age
Second –tier
pensions:
indexation of
earnings
measure
Australia 45.9 47.9 61.7 65 56 –
Austria 71.2 80.1 90.6 65 – Discretionary
Belgium 37.9 40.7 64.4 65 60 Prices
Canada 49.5 49.5 62.8 65 60 Prices
Czech Republic 49.1 54.3 70.3 63 60 Prices
Denmark 78.2 83.5 94.1 65 – –
Finland 58.2 63.4 68.0 65 62 Wages/prices
France 37.5 51.2 62.8 60 – Prices
Germany 35.5 39.9 57.3 65 63 Wages
Greece 92.9 95.7 111.1 65 56 Discretionary
Hungary 66.6 76.9 96.5 62 – Wages/prices
Iceland 74.8 80.1 86.9 67 – Prices
Ireland 38.2 38.2 44.4 66 65 –
Italy 61.0 67.9 77.9 65 60 Prices
Japan 34.4 36.8 41.5 65 60 Prices
Korea 64.6 72.7 77.8 65 60 Prices
Luxembourg 79.8 90.3 98.0 65 57 Wages
Mexico 31.5 36.6 37.3 65 – –
Netherlands 76.7 81.7 105.3 65 60 Wages
New Zealand 46.8 46.8 46.6 65 – –
Norway 59.0 60.0 70.0 67 – Wages
Poland 53.3 61.2 74.8 65 – Prices
Portugal 54.3 54.3 67.4 65 55 Prices/GDP
Slovak Republic 46.8 56.7 71.9 62 – Prices/Wages
Spain 81.2 81.2 84.2 65 60 Prices
Sweden 60.5 63.7 66.2 65 61 Wages
Switzerland 58.2 62.0 68.8 65 63 Wages/prices
Turkey 65.9 72.5 103.4 65 – Prices
UK 32.6 34.4 45.4 65 – Prices
USA 43.6 43.6 55.3 67 62 Prices
OECD average 56.3 60.8 72.1 – –
Source: OECD 2007
Note: The final column refers to the mechanism by which second-tier pensions are indexed. Some countries use different rules for lower and  
  higher pension levels and some combine an index with GDP or similar measure.
were those based largely or wholly on Pay-as-You- Go 
principles, and the introduction of DC schemes and other 
changes noted above were a response to this challenge. 
However, governments have also moved to adopt public 
pension reserves, as a device to fund pensions ‘up front’. 
Ireland introduced the National Pension Reserve Fund, 
while other countries such as Canada, New Zealand and 
Norway have also adopted such pre-funding mechanisms.
The emerging evidence on the impact of pension reforms 
seems clear, according to the OECD. Reflecting the relative 
reduction in state versus private provision and the 
specific changes in contribution requirements, pension 
ages, the role of DC schemes, and the mechanisms for 
indexation, there will be ‘a reduced pension promise for 
today’s workers compared with past generations’ (OECD, 
2007; 74). The OECD adds that the tendency towards lower 
replacement rates may result in ‘a resurgence in old age 
poverty in some countries’ (OECD, 2007:75). However, 
it is important for policy makers in Ireland to note the 
variation in the reforms’ impacts across countries. Table 
9 shows the estimated impact on replacement rates of the 
reforms; clearly, in the majority of the countries studied, 
pension generosity will decline. However, some reforms 
will improve pensions for both men and women, and 
to illustrate the implications of alternative reforms for 
future policy in Ireland the contrasting experiences of 
specific countries are noted, with Hungary as an example 
of positive impacts and Poland as an example of more 
gender-negative impacts8.
Hungary’s reforms will result in significantly improved 
replacement ratios for both men and women (part of this 
improvement, it should be noted, derives from a change 
in taxation, as the pension was related to earnings net 
of taxes before the reform). The core of the reformed 
pension system is an earnings-related public pension 
combined with a mandatory, funded DC scheme. This 
system applies to all new labour market entrants and all 
those aged 42 or less at the time of the reform (1997/8). 
In the earnings-related system the ceiling on pensionable 
earnings is high at 4.2 times the average, and pensions 
in payment are indexed to a combination of prices and 
wages. There is also a minimum pension (i.e. a minimum 
pension independently of means or contributions) set 
at 25% of net average earnings (to be abolished in 2009). 
In the case of the DC scheme, 8% of gross earnings 
are invested in the fund, the capital in which must be 
converted into an annuity; the annuity must have the 
same indexation arrangements as the earnings-related 
pension. From a gender perspective, it is critical to note 
that the life tables used to calculate annuities must be 
unisex. This avoids the problem of women acquiring lower 
DC pensions because of their greater longevity.
In contrast, replacement ratios are projected to decline 
significantly in Mexico and Poland. The Polish case is 
an example of a change from a conventional defined 
benefit scheme to a funded scheme. Under the pre-reform 
scenario there were two components. The first was a 
flat-rate payment linked to average earnings (net of social 
insurance contributions) set at 24% of economy-wide 
earnings, and conditional on 25 years contributions for 
men and 20 for women, and the second was an earnings-
related pension paying 1.3% of earnings for each year of 
contributions using a ‘best years’ formula linked to the 
average wage.  There are two components to the reformed 
system, of which the first is a system of notional accounts. 
A contribution of 12.2% of earnings will be credited to 
individuals’ accounts and at retirement the capital is 
converted into a pension benefit, applying a formula based 
on average life expectancy at retirement. Contributions 
are re-valued by price inflation plus 75% of the growth 
in the real (covered wage bill). The second component 
is a funded, Defined Contribution pension which is also 
obligatory for those aged under 30 at the time of the 
reform. A 7.5% share of total contributions is deposited 
into a fund which will be converted into an annuity, which 
the calculations assume will be indexed to prices. Under 
both scenarios there is also a minimum pension. The 
structure of this minimum is unchanged, but for 2005 the 
indexation formula will switch to prices only from a mixed 
prices/wages formula.
8 The impact is estimated by contrasting two scenarios for workers entering the labour market in 2004: one in which the pension is calculated as if the pre-reform pension  
 system applies and the other in which the pension system post-reform applies.
Table 9. 
Gross Replacement rates, workers on average earnings, and percentage points change in public 
spending on pensions/GDP, selected countries
Country
Men Women(if different) Change in % of GDP  
1900-2003 spent on  
old age and survivors’ 
pensionsPre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Austria 90.0 80.1 80.0 80.1 1.3
Finland 66.3 63.4 -1.7
France 64.7 51.2 1.4
Germany 48.7 39.9 1.5
Hungary 57.7 76.9 52.7 76.9 n.a
Italy 90.0 67.9 80.0 52.8 3.6
Japan 40.7 34.4 4.3
Korea 69.3 66.8 0.6
Mexico 72.5 35.8 72.5 29.7 0.7
New Zealand 39.7 39.7 -2.9
Poland 62.2 61.2 57.3 44.5 7.2
Portugal 90.1 54.1 5.1
Slovak Rep 59.5 56.7 6.5
Sweden 78.9 62.1 1.5
Turkey 107.6 72.5 102.8 72.5 n.a.
UK 30.8 30.8 0.8
Source: OECD 2007: 64-66
As the details show, the gross replacement rates are 
projected to decline significantly for women and slightly 
for men; this result is replicated when a net replacement 
rate is used. This projection of the outcome in a reform 
based on funding principles is reflected in the case of 
Mexico. Briefly, the reform here also entailed a move to 
a funded scheme (in this case privately managed) from a 
defined-benefit scheme.
The implication of the OECD review of the reforms is that 
there is considerable diversity in the reform measures 
and that reforms can have very different projected effects 
on men and women. These particular findings should be 
viewed in the light of the emerging research on the gender 
impact of pension reforms already in place. The recent 
studies of the Australian mandatory funded scheme, for 
example, show the importance for women in particular 
of offsetting a private funded model with an enhanced 
state pension. Having projected the employment and 
earnings profiles of the 60s ‘baby boom’ generation now 
close to retirement, one study concludes that women’s 
superannuation accumulations – derived from employers’ 
contribution of 9% of gross earnings – will be at least 35% 
lower than men’s. This minimum gap derives only from 
differential average earnings and number of years in 
employment. If other gender differences (such as gender 
differences in returns to education, higher life expectancy, 
lower non–wage income, occupational segregation, and so 
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on) were included in the estimates, the gap would  
be higher, leading the authors to conclude that:
[the] publicly financed age pensions will remain  
a significant source of retirement income for most 
baby boomers and for women in particular. It is 
important to direct attention to this pillar of the 
Australian retirement income framework and to 
consider the gender biases inherent within the 
current system. Minor changes to superannuation 
policy will not address the gender disparities 
inherent in a framework based on a nexus  
with paid employment (Jefferson and Peston,  
2005: 95; emphasis added).
A recent analysis of reforms in three Latin American 
countries based on funding and DC principles likewise 
points to the importance for women of substantially 
improving the first-tier state pension (James, Edwards 
and Wong, 2003). This analysis also shows that certain 
groups of older women can gain relative to men from very 
specific aspects of the reforms, such as; the use of unisex 
life tables, joint annuities for married men and women, 
age-related additions to the state pensions for the very 
old. For policy makers in Ireland, the net implication 
of the emerging evidence about pension reform is that 
strong first-tier state pensions are especially important 
for women and that reforms of retirement income 
arrangements closely tied to lifetime employment (and 
therefore income) can worsen gender disparities in 
retirement income unless specifically designed to  
counter them.
Gender and Pension Systems 
At the time of writing the Irish pension system is in 
transition, with policy makers poised to reshape the 
overall structure by adding – or attempting to add – a 
comprehensive second tier of pensions. The international 
evidence suggests that implementation of such a reform 
has implications for the relative pension prospects of 
men and women. It is important, therefore, at this point 
to place the detail of recent reform proposals in Ireland 
against a broad backdrop. In turn, this requires an 
outline of the relevant dimensions of Irish social policy as 
portrayed in comparative social policy analyses.
In this context, as Figure 4 records, there are two relevant 
dimensions that put Ireland’s welfare state, and pension 
system, in context.
The typology is useful as it identifies the underlying 
factors that shaped the countries’ welfare states. As 
such, it captures the fundamental character, rather 
than the specific details, of these welfare states prior to 
the restructuring processes that began in the 1980s and 
accelerated in the 1990s and beyond. 
First, the typology deploys the familiar regimes from 
Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism9. 
This dimension reflects how comprehensive the overall 
welfare system was in the mid-to-late 1980s and how 
egalitarian the thrust of social policies were: it would 
be measured by variables such as the share of GDP 
accruing to social expenditure, the extent of income and 
wage inequality and the level of income replacement 
offered by unemployment benefits, pensions, and so on. 
Typically, the Nordic states lie in the comprehensive 
Figure 4. Dimensions of Social Policy and Country Proto-types
Welfare Regime Type Gender Classification - Male Breadwinner
Strong Moderate Weak(Adult worker)
Universal Norway Sweden
Corporatist Japan France
Liberal Ireland New Zealand
Source: Esping-Andersen (1990), Lewis (1991)
9 This widely cited classification has not gone unchallenged. However, recent reviews of the typology and of attempts to repudiate or refine it confirm its broad validity  
 (Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Ireland, it should be noted, sits somewhat uneasily in Esping-Andersen’s original framework as it had weak scores on indicators of both  
 liberalism and corporatism, although most comparative analysts are content to assign Ireland to the liberal ‘world of welfare’.
end of this continuum and Ireland, the UK, the US and 
the Australasian states at the liberal end. In pension 
terms this meant that liberal countries typically relied 
on private pensions to a considerable degree and offered 
flat rate state pensions giving modest benefits rather 
than significant income replacement. Corporatist regimes 
– typified by Japan, Germany, France, Italy – rely largely 
on social or other collective forms of insurance tied to 
employment. They structure their pensions and other 
social provisions around employment and occupational 
groups – in the German, French and Italian cases the 
trade unions have an important role in the structuring 
and management of pensions – and the pensions confer 
generous income replacement pensions. 
Second, the columns in Figure 4 summarise the male-
breadwinner dimension. This captures how strongly states 
historically adhered to social and employment policies 
that reflect male patterns of employment and create and 
reinforce female subordination and dependence (Lewis, 
1991). One end of this continuum comprises ‘strong male 
breadwinner’ states such as Ireland, Italy and Japan, 
built essentially on the principle of male domination in 
employment and the assignment of women to maternal 
and caring roles. These states had tax systems based on 
marriage, state social security and pensions structured 
around women as secondary, dependent beneficiaries, an 
absence of state support for working parents’ child care, 
the cumulative effect of which was to keep female and, 
in particular, maternal employment participation low. 
This model translated into inferior old age pension rights 
for women; lower state and private pensions because of 
their lower life-time employment and exclusion from 
individually entitled state and private pensions. In 
contrast, the weak version of the male breadwinner state 
focused on fuller employment participation by women, 
underpinned by state provisions to sustain maternal 
employment; greater individualisation in the tax system, 
strong maternity rights, state intervention in child care, 
and so on. The net outcome in such states was greater 
independent access by women to pensions, higher relative 
incomes in old age and lower poverty rates than in the 
liberal case. 
The moderate scenario refers to those countries –  
France being the clearest case – where support for 
motherhood and families generally was always strong. 
Here the objective of policy is to sustain the birth rate 
and family life, by offering generous support to families 
with dependent children at all income levels and in all 
employment statuses. This is done by using family status 
and family size as a criterion in taxation, family benefits 
and employment arrangements. While the focus of this 
model is on support for all families with children rather 
than employment-based gender equality (as in the weak 
case), it resulted in higher maternal employment and 
hence better pensions for women in old age. 
Finally in relation to this classification, it is important 
to observe – as a generalisation – that many countries, 
while remaining in the same location ‘vertically’ (in the 
rows of the typology), have shifted ‘horizontally’ towards 
a weaker version of the male breadwinner. Briefly, many 
welfare states have adopted policies and undergone 
changes that have substantially altered the gender profile 
of their social policies, resulting in some reduction in 
gender relativities. According to an authoritative analysis 
of such developments10, states have adopted varying mixes 
of the following policies:
Gender neutrality: the removal of formal discrimination 
in employment and social protection (for example, 
through the EU’s Equal Treatment Directive);
Gender reinforcemen:; addressing inequalities that 
arise from women’s unpaid domestic and care work by 
expanding entitlement based on the principle of care (for 
example, Carers’ benefits or social insurance credits for 
care) and improving women’s entitlement as wives;
Gender reconstruction: attempting to transform 
fundamental gender role differences by reforming the 
family-labour market link through family-friendly 
work policies, paternal as well as maternal leave, and 
challenging men to engage in domestic and care work;
Individualisation: Reform of family law to strengthen 
the rights of women within families and to give legal 
recognition to a variety of family forms, and restructuring 
the tax and benefit systems towards individuals (rather 
than families or households) as the unit of contribution 
and entitlement, (for example abolition of marriage-based 
means-testing and use of individual tax bands and credits 
in taxation). 
10 See Sainsbury’s (1996) Gender, Equality and Welfare States.
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In Ireland, it is clear, aspects of each of these strategies 
have been implemented, resulting in a moderation over 
time in the male breadwinner character of social policy 
generally, pensions included. It is important to note that 
within both the feminist literature and more general 
commentary there is considerable debate about how 
gender equality should be defined and implemented, 
about the relative effectiveness of the different strategies 
noted above and the actual mix of strategies pursued in 
different states.11 This theme is developed in Chapter 3 
in a wider discussion of feminist approaches to social 
security reform. It is worth noting here, however, that the 
liberal welfare states (the US, notably, but also Ireland) 
have inclined to emphasise gender neutrality strategies, 
involving the removal of formal, legal discrimination 
against women without achieving substantially more  
equal outcomes and provisions for men and women. 
In short, a comparison of the current Irish social welfare 
system with that prevailing twenty five years ago would 
show movement away from the ‘strong male breadwinner’ 
category towards the ‘weak male breadwinner’ within 
the liberal welfare regime. The current pension system, 
therefore, has the following defining attributes:
As a ‘liberal’ system, its core is a state pension 
payment at a low level relative to earnings, without 
a comprehensive second-tier pension (public or 
private) to provide income replacement for all, 
complemented by a voluntary, private second tier 
that is more accessible to men and to middle and 
higher income groups;
As a reformed, ‘weaker male breadwinner’ system, it 
offers state pensions based on contributory principles, 
with some recognition of women’s differential work and 
care profile, supplemented by a residual means-tested 
pension with a marriage-based means test.
A number of countries have this kind of pension system 
and at this point it is useful to study these more closely 
and – with the aid of a detailed comparison12 – to look  
at the gender-relevant variation within this type of 
pension system. Figure 5 summarises these countries’ 
pension arrangements.
In the first pension tier, four of the countries, Ireland 
included, have flat-rate basic pensions. In two of these 
cases, Ireland and the UK, these are contributory social 
insurance and in two others, Canada and New Zealand, 
tax-funded, residence-based pensions. Ireland, Canada and 
Australia also have social assistance provisions specifically 
for the elderly and retired, although the nature of the 
means test varies sharply from one country to another.
At the second tier, only three of the countries (UK,  
USA and Canada) have mandatory state earnings-related 
pensions, all of these systems providing defined benefit 
(DB) pensions in retirement. Uniquely, the UK allows 
workers to opt out of its state scheme (SERPS) into 
occupational or personal pensions. Australia, as noted 
earlier, has mandatory private pensions funded wholly 
by employer contributions, with the risk carried by 
employees as the pension is defined contribution  
in nature.
All six countries have a third tier of voluntary private 
provision, but its significance varies widely. Almost half  
of British pensioners received some private pension 
income, in contrast to about 15% in both Australia  
and New Zealand. In five of the six cases voluntary  
private provision – either occupational or personal – 
is substantially subsidised through tax incentives on 
employer/employee contributions. In relation to the 
quality of these pension systems for women, there are  
a number of key features that have lessons for Ireland.
First, in all six countries women are more reliant than 
men on state pensions, as women are less likely to 
have pension income; therefore, the level of the state 
pension is particularly important in preventing old age 
poverty among women. 
Second, mandatory state earnings-related pensions 
(such as SERPS in Britain, SS in the USA or Canada’s 
CPP) are more helpful than private pensions for 
women: state systems more easily allow disregards for 
years of low or zero earnings, and as DB schemes they 
offer more secure pensions than the DC schemes in 
private systems, and furthermore state schemes can be 
more easily skewed towards the low paid. 
Third, in five of the six countries the means test  
for couples is based on joint resources, potentially 
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11 Sainsbury’s (1994) account of these strategies implies that these strategies are mutually exclusive and that specific types of welfare state adopt one strategy rather than  
 another. Whatever the merits of this view, the Irish developments span the four different gender strategies, with possibly less emphasis on individualisation.
12 See Ginn, J., Street, D, and Arber, S, (2001) ‘ Women’s Pension Outlook; variation among liberal welfare states’ in Ginn, J. Street, D. and Arber, S eds. Women, Work and  
 Pensions. Buckingham: Open University Press
leaving married women open to loss of access to 
benefits if the husband has significant income or 
assets; the tapered withdrawal of benefits and ease of 
claiming in Ireland, Canada and Australia moderate 
these effects of means testing.
Fourth, there is a clear pattern linking the extent of 
gender inequality in retirement incomes with the 
public-private mix; as Ginn and her colleagues bluntly 
point out; ‘Thus countries where private pensions 
play the largest part (Britain and the USA) show the 
greatest inequality in retirement incomes. Evidence 
from the six countries suggests that this is not only 
because men are better able than women to obtain 
good private pensions but also because tax spending 
to subsidize private pensions reduces the resources 
needed to provide redistributive state pensions at an 
adequate level to all older people’ (2001:227).
Finally, it is important to note, one country’s pension 
system has been described as having ‘woman friendly 
aspects’13. New Zealand earns this accolade because it 
features a universal, tax-funded basic pension, based 
on residence and citizenship that awards a pension 
of around 40% of average earnings. While citizens are 
encouraged to participate in second-tier pensions, 
these are not supported by tax allowances. New 
Zealand therefore balances an unsubsidised second 
tier with a more adequate, universal first tier. In 2007 
a ‘soft mandatory’ second-tier pension was introduced, 
i.e. all those over aged 18 starting a new job will be 
automatically enrolled in the new ‘Kiwi Saver’ with 
the option of withdrawing, and with specific financial 
incentives to remain in the scheme; the international 
evidence implies that over time women’s retirement 
income relative to men’s will decline. 
Against this backdrop, chapter three turns to a discussion 
of feminist principles of pension reform.
Pensions: What Women Want Pensions: What Women Want 38 ˙
13 The phrase is used in St. John, S. and Gran, B. (2001) ‘The World’s Social Laboratory; women friendly aspects of New Zealand pensions’ in Ginn, J.,Street, D. and 
 Arber, S. eds, Women, Work and Pensions. Buckingham: Open University Press.
3 CHAPTER THREE
A gendered model for Pensions Reform
The challenge is to develop this learning into practical 
proposals for Irish pension policy. This chapter elaborates 
a theoretical framework which can be of practical use in 
developing NWCI pensions policy. The chapter develops 
earlier NWCI proposals for a woman’s model for social 
welfare reform (Murphy 2003). Specifically, it uses wider 
feminist care and work typologies to locate pensions 
policy in the wider context of Irish women’s social 
care and economic participation patterns (discussed in 
Chapter 2). The chapter promotes a vision which stresses 
women’s economic participation in the context of a 
strong gender-neutral care ethic ‘carer-worker model’. 
Key to this pension model is the capacity to recognise, 
engage with and compensate for present unequal gender 
care and labour market patterns and to do this without 
reinforcing unequal gender care roles. This vision, while 
ambitious, recognises the need for pension policy to work 
incrementally alongside other social economic and labour 
policies towards greater gender equality in work, care and 
pension outcomes.
The chapter ends by outlining the core principles of 
a gender-oriented pensions reform agenda. The key 
principle informing more specific practical proposals 
for a gendered model of pensions is women’s economic 
autonomy or financial independence. Of the more specific 
pension policy principles the key principle stressed is 
adequacy. The next chapter then applies this model to 
develop specific proposals for women-centred proposals 
for pension reform.
The social construction of care roles 
The previous chapter discussed how ‘working age’ is a 
political and socially constructed concept. Feminist theory 
recognises that gender is a socially constructed concept. 
Different to biological sex roles, gender roles are an 
outcome of cultural values often expressed in government 
policies, societal norms and attitudes. It is essential, then, 
to understand how care roles and expectations, so central 
to women’s lived experience, are socially constructed. 
We have moved quickly in Ireland, where a woman’s role 
was primarily constructed as a primary carer, to care 
being increasingly commodified, i.e. a good that can be 
purchased outside the home in the childcare and elder 
care market. Government policy has played an explicit 
role in this transition: on the one hand, government policy 
has supported development of a privatised childcare and 
elder care infrastructure; on the other hand, government 
has avoided introducing paid paternal or parental leave – 
policies which might offer choice to working parents 
considering care options. 
The lessons from Chapter One and Chapter Two are clear. The review by the OECD (2007) underscores 
the importance, from a gender perspective, of maintaining and improving the adequacy of first-tier 
pensions and of developing mandatory public second-tier pension schemes. In all types of pension 
schemes, it is possible, by paying attention to crucial design details, to maximise gender equality 
outcomes. In means-tested schemes, for example, it is possible to approach resource testing to 
maximise the likelihood of individual entitlement. In second-tier mandatory public schemes, gender 
differentials in working life can be mitigated by rules concerning access and calculation methods, 
and in second-tier pensions, private scheme use of unisex life tables and joint annuities or pension-
splitting for married couples.
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These social constructions of care are problematic. 
One of the problems in developing a model for pension 
reform is to define a concept of care that is more than a 
conservative male breadwinner conception of care or a 
liberal, rational economic conception of care. We need 
to develop a different understanding about relations 
between people. The following discussion draws heavily 
from Lynch and Baker (2005) and Lynch and Lyons (2008) 
who argue that care is not simply a woman’s obligation 
or a mechanistic function that can be purchased, they 
argue a liberal concept of citizenship ignores the reality 
of dependency and interdependency, and implicitly – and 
often explicitly – equates citizenship with being a ‘paid 
worker’. They argue that to ignore or not recognise the 
reality of human dependency and interdependency is to 
ignore and undervalue much of the care and love work 
that women do without pay. This leaves such women 
vulnerable to the control and abuse of others. 
Lynch and Baker (2005) offer a ‘feminist egalitarian 
perspective’ which emphasises the fact that the citizen  
is also a universal caregiver and care receiver – a person 
who has citizenship with or without paid employment 
based on a relational rather than an autonomous view 
of the person. This perspective sees the citizen as 
independent, interdependent and dependent. It also allows 
for a definition of ‘love labour’ as work that involves 
emotional and other work oriented to the enrichment  
and enablement of others and the bonds between self  
and others. Lynch and Lyons (2008) identify that such 
work is both a sentient (thinking, and planning for others, 
attentiveness, managing relations and conflict) and non-
sentient activity (practical tasks). It involves the creation 
and transformation of persons and relationships, the  
object of such relationships is the enrichment of other 
persons and the reinforcement of the relationship itself.  
It is a set of perspectives and orientations integrated  
with tasks: attentiveness to the needs of others; 
responsibility; commitment. 
This interdependency and mutuality is often spread over 
time and unevenly distributed across women’s life cycles. 
Thus, the moral imperatives on women to undertake 
love labour and care labour is often experienced as 
both a burden and a pleasure, obligation and love 
simultaneously. As Lynch (2007) rightly observes, this 
obligation has costs in terms of time and energy; it is also 
a service that is indispensable for the continuation of 
the entire society. Care work is fundamental and has to 
be provided by somebody. Whoever is providing it needs 
to be given due recognition and valued not just at that 
moment but throughout the life cycle.
 
While acknowledging this affective function of 
parenthood in general and motherhood in particular, it 
is necessary to be critically aware that the value placed 
on women’s care roles is also socially constructed by 
government policy. Most women at some stage in their 
lives will have caring responsibilities. Many engage in 
care over three generations of family life (for young 
children, elderly parents, relatives with disabilities and/or 
partners with chronic illnesses). In a social welfare system 
structured on the male breadwinner model the caring 
role of the woman is most often recognised in the female 
partner’s classification as a dependant (or qualified adult). 
In Ireland both tax and social security policy have played 
a strong role in socially constructing ‘wifely labour’ 
(Shaver and Bradshaw, 1995). No value is placed directly 
on the demands of the caring role, most women carers are 
viewed officially as adjuncts of their partners and remain 
financially dependent on their partner’s income, whether 
on social welfare or in employment. Since the 1970s new 
social policy developments have recognised lone parents 
in their own right as primary carers (but only to means-
tested payments and with strong socially constructed 
rules limiting their sexuality). Likewise, the principal 
payment for caring, Carer’s Allowance, is determined 
according to household means rather than on the basis of 
the woman’s care responsibilities. 
The care infrastructure remains underdeveloped both 
for childcare and elder care. While the Government has 
started a programme of investment in childcare, most 
childcare is still provided in the informal economy or by 
private providers who, because their services are labour-
intensive, are obliged to charge high fees. Similarly, 
elder care is increasingly available only through private 
providers with the result that costs are extremely high. It 
is still expected that women will undertake most caring 
responsibilities. Since the longest period of child-focused 
leave is maternity leave, available only to women, and 
since men are reluctant to or simply cannot afford to avail 
themselves of unpaid parental leave, official Government 
policy reinforces the notion that men do not have a duty 
to care for their children.
This is the reality from which we begin to develop a 
feminist model of pension reform. On the one hand, 
the model has to cope with the reality of this deeply 
entrenched but socially constructed world. On the  
other, it should not further reinforce this world. Rather  
it should aim to be part of the building blocks used to 
socially construct a world of gender equality in work,  
care, pensions and life.
Feminist care and work typologies 
Pensions policy cannot be divorced from this socially 
constructed wider cycle of women’s lives. We do not 
arrive suddenly at old age: rather aging is a cumulative 
process and the resources and assets we bring to old age 
are those that we have cumulatively gathered over a life 
time of working and caring. Gough (2001) illustrates the 
impact of the gender pay gap on post-retirement earnings. 
She argues that the factors that affect women’s earnings 
during their working years go on to affect their earnings 
in retirement: ‘part time working, career patterns, types 
of occupation and employment all contribute not only to 
keeping women’s earnings lower than men’s during their 
working life but also to a reduced pension entitlement 
to benefits from occupational pension schemes after 
retirement’. A feminist framework has to engage with 
women’s cumulative experience. 
This section therefore reviews feminist literature to locate 
a feminist labour market and care typology that can help 
NWCI articulate its vision for pension reform. It begins 
by reflecting on how the male breadwinner concept has 
helped articulate past discrimination, and explores how 
the gender differentiated models like the Mother-Worker 
help to articulate the present duplicate roles women play. 
Finally, it explores gender-neutral approaches of the 
Adult-Worker, and the Carer Worker models which help 
distinguish choices about the future allocation of work 
and care between men and women. 
Male breadwinner typologies  
(describing the past) 
The most widely used gender-aware or feminist  
approach to consideration of social welfare policy is that 
of the male breadwinner approach used in Chapter One 
and by Murphy (2003) for previous NWCI analysis  
of social security reform. Originally developed as the 
male breadwinner model (Lewis 2003), it has been further 
developed by Pfau-Effinger into the modernized male 
breadwinner model which incorporates the notion of 
women working part-time over certain stages of the 
life cycle. This model, as the discussion in Chapter One 
illustrated, is theoretically useful in illuminating the 
historical experience of pension reform. However, as  
a model it is less useful in enabling us to visualise 
the future. Even a ‘weak male breadwinner model’ is 
conceptually and linguistically focused on the male as 
breadwinner and does not fully incorporate the vision  
of economic autonomy for women It does not therefore 
serve the function of articulating a feminist vision for 
reform. It would be ironic, for example, for the NWCI  
to publicly advocate a weak male breadwinner model  
of pensions reform. 
Gender-differentiated approaches  
(describing the present) 
Wollenscraft originally distinguished between two 
feminist or gender-aware approaches; models that reflect 
a desire to create greater conditions of equality and 
models that seek to respect and accommodate difference 
Box 1: Feminist work-care typologies
Male- focused typologies (Past)
Male breadwinner 
Modernised male breadwinner
Gender differentiated (Present)
Mother worker model
Gender-neutral (Future)
Adult worker model (no care ethic)
Carer worker model (care ethic)
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between genders (Fredericks, Maier and de Graff 2007). 
The gender- differentiated approach seeks to respect 
and accommodate the difference between genders by 
redefining the financial value of unpaid work: it assumes 
traditional gender differences in relation to care but seeks 
to increase the societal value placed on care work. This 
raises the question of what type of care work should be 
valued and how. The discussion of labour market and care 
trends in Chapter 2 suggests Irish mothers will continue 
to have interrupted paid employment patterns to 
accommodate child and elder care. It is essential then for 
reform options to accommodate in the short to medium 
term a pro-woman model of care and work, where a 
balance is struck between enabling the reality of care and 
equality of participation in paid employment for women 
and men. This could be referred to as the mother-worker 
model which, while gender- differentiating women’s 
experience as mothers and carers, also firmly seeks to 
socially construct women as paid workers (Leira, 2002) 
This recognizes the present gender-differentiated reality 
of women’s lives as mothers and the reality, at least over 
the next generation, that women will experience greater 
interruption of working life due to childbirth and early 
infant care. This model incorporates rather than ignores 
women’s differentiated experiences but it does not seek to 
reinforce this care role and, equally, stresses the worker 
role of the modern woman who has a significant life time 
attachment to the labour market. Such a model suggests 
that accommodating, recognising and valuing the dual 
roles of the mother as a carer and a worker needs to be 
an integral part of pensions policy and is the immediate 
approach to pension reform in Ireland. The difficulty with 
the model is that it may accept or reinforce traditional, 
socially constructed care roles that work against women’s 
broader interests. This works directly against one of the 
principles outlined above, gender neutrality. Women’s 
labour market participation is central to achieving both 
gender equality and also a sustainable context for future 
provision of pensions. 
Gender-neutral approaches 
The EU (2003) report on greater equality for men and 
women highlights the evolving social and economic 
roles of men and women, the moves away from the 
male breadwinner model to women’s greater economic 
independence and the need to focus on reconciling work 
and family life for both parents. A more liberal type of 
feminist approach seeks to reconstruct gender roles 
to share the paid labour roles more equally. Various 
models that focus on reformulating the conditions of paid 
work can be distinguished by the degree to which they 
accommodate an ethic of care and by the degree to which 
they work towards equal sharing of that care. Ideally, 
working with the principles outlined above, the feminist 
approach most consistent with NWCI values is one where 
both care and work are equally shared but also where 
there is accommodation of a care ethic in the wider  
society and economy. 
The ‘adult worker model’ (Knijn and Kremer 1997, 
Williams 2004) places labor market participation 
firmly in the driver’s seat and focuses on the terms and 
conditions that will facilitate women’s employment. This 
reflects policy in many Western European countries and 
the direction of the European Commission. The model 
assumes that men and women share paid and unpaid 
work equally, with both working three-quarter time jobs 
and with greater time for sharing care and other forms 
of housework. While the model informs much thinking 
about labour market and social security reform (for 
example ‘flexicurity’ (EC 2007) it assumes that men will 
‘embrace a more feminine life course’ (Esping-Andersen 
2005, Fraser 1997). Recognising the practical difficulty of 
accommodating care and fully sharing care, one version 
of this model veers towards practically accommodating 
what were women’s care obligations by the addition of 
‘the commodification model’. Esping-Andersen argues 
that pensions equality can be best achieved by fully 
‘marketising’ childcare so that the burden of family care 
is taken from women, allowing them to achieve a greater 
level of activation in the labour market. This model has 
been criticised for failing to recognize the degree of 
gender segregation that exists in the labour market and 
the relationship between gender pay gaps and pensions 
inequality. It also fails to acknowledge that even in a 
fully commodified childcare market women’s lives are 
interrupted by childbirth. Lewis (2003) and others remain 
sceptical that society is capable of making the profound 
changes required of the ‘adult-worker model’ or that 
women want the commercial version of childcare offered 
in the ‘commodification model’. 
It seems the adult worker model under emphasizes 
the ethic of care while a totally gender-differentiated 
approach perhaps overemphasizes an ethic of care and 
narrows its application to women as mothers. Neither the 
adult worker model-offering full life time labour market 
participation without involvement in childcare, nor the 
gender-differentiated approach reinforcing women’s 
traditional care roles offer greater choice, and neither 
may be what many women in modern Irish society want.
In the longer term, if appropriate policy measures are 
taken to fully develop men’s care role, it is possible to 
vision a carer-worker model where both care and paid 
employment are shared more equally and a higher 
form of gender equality is achieved. This approach and 
the incremental progress it implies is well captured in 
Hobson’s (2003:76) Gender Model of Individualisation, 
Participation and Equity (see Figure 6). This theorises an 
incremental or staged approach to reaching the fuller 
model of gender equality. The various feminist work care 
typologies are plotted into this model to show how to 
incrementally move from a male bread- winner approach 
to the present mother worker stage but towards the 
longer term goal of reaching a carer- worker model. The 
key lesson for feminists is that pensions policy is not 
isolated, it forms part of a suite of policies that, taken 
together over time, have the capacity to achieve ultimate 
gender equality. Previous recommendations for the 
reform of the Irish social welfare system recognises the 
importance of building, in an incremental fashion, on the 
system that already exists (Murphy 2003). Welfare reform 
itself happens incrementally and also requires horizontal 
Figure 6 Hobson’s (2003:76) Gender Model of Individualisation, Participation and Equity
  (amended by authors)
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complementary reform in other dimensions of economic 
and social policy. 
We conclude this discussion about feminist approaches 
to pension reform by affirming the need for a planned 
integrated approach across all economic and social policy. 
This approach should be informed by an ethic of care 
and recognise that while presently gender-differentiated 
care roles leave us nearer a mother-worker model but are 
ultimately aspiring towards a carer- worker model.
Principles of a woman-centred pension model
Chapter One reflected on how there has been some 
progress away from a strong male bread- winner 
model. This Irish progress in social welfare reform 
has been characterised by fuller gender neutrality, 
(removal of formal discrimination in employment and 
social protection, for example, through the EU’s Equal 
Treatment Directive) and by gender reinforcement 
(where inequalities that arise from women’s unpaid 
domestic and care work were addressed by expanding 
entitlement based on the principle of care through Carers’ 
benefits or Carers credit disregards). There has been little 
significant progress in relation to gender reconstruction 
or attempting to transform the underlying gender role 
differences, or in individualisation or movement towards 
restructuring the tax and benefit systems towards the 
individual as the unit of contribution and entitlement. 
This provides the starting point for developing feminist 
women- centred principles for pension reform. The two 
primary principles are economic autonomy or individual 
entitlement and enabling a gender-neutral ethic of care.
The headline news that the Irish Times/Behaviour 
and Attitudes opinion poll revealed that financial 
independence is very important for Irish women today 
(Irish Times, Thursday, September 27, 2007) came as little 
surprise to NWCI members. This principle of economic 
independence is the core message voiced by women 
who over the years have written and phoned NWCI 
to passionately express concern about their own and 
collective pension issues (excerpts from these letters  
form the basis of the cover of this report). The issue of 
a neutral ethic of care is very much a futuristic vision. 
Hilliard (2006) records a significant change in attitudes 
towards women’s and mothers’ participation in the  
labour market. However, the daily reality of women’s 
lives has not changed as rapidly: McGinnity et al’s (2007) 
analysis of time use shows women’s lives are  
still disproportionately dominated by housework and 
domestic chores as well as care work.
A reform agenda centred on feminist reform 
principles would make more significant progress 
on individualisation, and redress previous gender 
construction of care roles by rebalancing care roles and 
domestic work away from women and towards men. The 
reform model must respect and facilitate women’s present 
role as workers and carers but also work towards a vision 
of more equal sharing of paid employment and care work, 
in effect socially construct men as carers and as people 
who do a fair share of domestic tasks. 
Principles of feminist pension reform 
• Economic autonomy. Financial autonomy and 
individual entitlement are core characteristics of 
a feminist pension model. The key challenge for a 
feminist model is to move to a feminist model of 
pensions where women have direct rights. 
• Labour Market Equality. Gender inequality in 
pensions is primarily a function of cumulative 
labour market inequality. A woman-friendly pension 
cannot happen without measures to address gender 
inequality in working life and without reforms to 
support and maximise high levels of female labour 
market participation for considerable periods of 
their adult lives. 
• Facilitating atypical work. Gender equality in 
pensions requires a pensions model that recognises 
and rewards all labour market participation.
• Ethic of care. No reform can be complete without 
the development of a care contingency that enables 
care work to be facilitated and respected, and that 
enables women to have pension cover and maintain 
pension contribution records during key stages  
of care. 
• Equal sharing of care obligations. The method of 
facilitating and/or compensating for time 
spent caring during working age should not 
disproportionately lock women into long-term 
patterns of caring (McLaughlin, 2001). This 
requires the State to invest in a child and elder care 
infrastructure and also requires the state to have 
parallel policy promoting men’s full engagement 
with care obligations. This can be achieved by 
way of statutory family-friendly policy, obligatory 
paid paternal leave and supporting traditionally 
male employment sectors to engage more fully in 
developing work/life balance policy and culture.
• Pension equality or pension justice. While
working towards greater gender equality in terms of 
participation in care and employment, the pensions 
system must not reinforce and must be capable of 
compensating for the disproportionate time women 
spend in periods of care and the wider gender 
equality women experience in the labour market.
• Retrospective pensions justice. The pensions 
model must be able to compensate for the 
disproportionate time older Irish women have 
already spend in periods of care and the significant 
historical discriminatory practices (until 1973 
married Irish women were banned from public 
employment and women also experienced other 
discriminatory policies and practices) which led to 
significant gender inequality in the labour market. 
Retrospective pensions justice can be delivered by a 
ring-fenced time-related policy package or by a more 
integrated approach. Given the complexity involved, 
it might be preferable to administer retrospective 
pension justice by way of a ring-fenced package, 
alternatively a comprehensive pension guarantee 
would deliver, with immediate effect.
Alongside these principles for a gender-sensitive pensions 
model there are also other broader principles which 
should inform the development of pensions policy. These 
are adopted from the Commission for Social Welfare 
(1986), the NESF (1984), various Pensions Board reports 
and the Green Paper. 
• To ensure antipoverty outcomes and a minimum 
 adequate income standard 
• To ensure equity, fairness, simplicity, transparency  
 and good governance (basic principles of good  
 policy) 
• To protect against vulnerability in a more volatile 
global economy by ensuring an appropriate and 
sustainable balance between state-led and market-
led provision for risk
• To allow for some provision for income replacement
• To enable flexible mobile lifestyles consistent with  
 the high levels of migration in modern societies
• In the context of a wider equality framework, to
enable diversity and inclusion relating to ongoing 
work, family and life style choices on old age and 
to respect family formation and sexual orientation 
choices.
Of these principles the principle of adequacy stands out 
(Ginn 2004). Women, having a higher rate of poverty, will 
benefit from more generous first-tier pensions, but it is 
also the case that, as OECD (2007) found, because women 
rely more on first-tier pensions, generous first-tier 
pension schemes work best for women. Without adequacy 
other principles, especially the principle of economic 
autonomy, have less meaning. The next chapter examines 
three core options for pension reform by evaluating how 
far the different options progress the gender-specific and 
more general principles discussed above.
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4 CHAPTER FOUR
Detailed recommendations for pension reform
The chapter does not promote tax-supported voluntary 
savings and argues there are regressive anti-poverty 
and gender equality outcomes from all private pension 
savings schemes as they immediately favour only those 
who can afford to save, that is those who are in relatively 
secure and well paid employment. Better value and 
more secure outcomes can be achieved from investing in 
state-led approaches to pension provision. However, for 
the purposes of engendering debate about all aspects of 
private pensions policy, the chapter compares the gender 
and anti-poverty dimension of the debate about standard 
rating voluntary private pensions and the separate but 
related debate about whether private pension schemes 
should be mandatory. The chapter draws attention to 
alternative more progressive and equitable mechanisms 
to promote private savings and argues these could and 
should be considered as alternatives to tax-supported 
pension schemes. 
The options 
Discussion now focuses on the gender implications of 
three key policy reform options. 
• A first-tier option which places the primary focus
on income adequacy, a Comprehensive Pension 
Guarantee. This discussion includes a variant  
of a means or income-tested pension.
• A second tier which has a primary focus on income 
replacement and redistribution; a mandatory social 
insurance/pay related with a well developed care/
gender dimension capable of replacing present 
gender anomalies in the social insurance system. 
• A third tier (if considered necessary for income 
replacement purposes or because it is considered 
necessary to incentivise national savings) of private 
pensions savings. The discussion here focuses on the 
possible reform options for private pension scheme 
and focuses on three key debates: making 
tax reliefs more equitable and progressive, the 
gender implications of making private pensions 
mandatory and the need for government to regulate 
private pension provision to ensure schemes are 
gender-neutral, eg requiring unisex life tables and 
pension splitting. 
This chapter develops pension reform options from a gender and antipoverty perspective. Reviewing 
variants of different policy combinations, it plots various reform options and discusses how they 
deliver the objectives of the feminist principles for pension reform developed in the previous chapter. 
It begins by introducing a proposal for the preferred default reform option, a First-Tier Comprehensive 
Minimum Income Guarantee. It then discusses, in the event that means-tested approaches are 
maintained, how to maximise the gender equality and antipoverty dimensions within means-tested 
first-tier pension regimes. The chapter moves to introduce a proposal for the preferred second-tier 
default option, a mandatory social insurance/pay-related scheme with a strong accommodation of 
care and built-in mechanisms to compensate for the gender inequalities experienced in the working 
life of women.  It then discusses some of the reforms needed to the present social insurance system 
to achieve a mandatory social insurance scheme that has this strong care and gender dimension.  
The issue of retrospective pension justice is also addressed. 
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“My long search for security 
in my later years has left me 
feeling frustrated with the 
Social Welfare system. I feel 
unvalued by the state for all the 
years I’ve given to caring, we 
were unpaid workers who took 
care of parents. We save the 
state a lot of money.”
Mary
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A comprehensive income guarantee scheme 
It is surely one of the most ironic features of social 
security systems that the more targeted the scheme 
the less effective it is in reducing poverty (Hassain and 
Kangas, 2006). There is a strong argument, therefore, from 
both an antipoverty and a gender autonomy perspective, 
to have a first- tier pension based on a comprehensive 
pension guarantee scheme. While the ideas and intent 
behind basic income has merit, the previous NWCI 
model for social welfare reform did not use a universal 
reform proposal as a template for working/aged 
payments14. There is no reason, however, not to consider 
a comprehensive income guarantee scheme for children 
(which is already in existence in the form of child benefit) 
or for old age payments. McCashin (2006) makes a strong 
argument for a comprehensive income guarantee scheme 
as a bulwark against poverty in old age. This approach 
would basically make a social security pension payment to 
all who can prove long- term residence and who are over  
the age of 65. The World Bank (1994; 240) praised schemes 
that provide benefits
 
‘to everyone of pensionable age regardless of 
income, wealth or employment history as in New 
Zealand and the basic pensions paid in the Nordic 
countries.15 Administratively this is the simplest 
structure with the lowest transaction costs for the 
public pillar. It avoids the disincentive to work and 
save inherent in means-tested plans. Its universal 
coverage helps to ensure that the poverty reduction 
objectives are met …’ 
Economic Autonomy. A comprehensive income 
guarantee scheme or a model of social welfare for 
pensions modelled on a participation income meets all 
the required principles of individual entitlement and 
economic autonomy, and so rates highly as a model that 
provides pension justice for all women. It offers the 
opportunity to eliminate the concept of qualified adults 
or adult dependency in the social insurance system – this 
will make the system easier to administer and eradicates 
the controversial issue of means-testing contributory 
payments. 
Retrospective Justice. Early introduction of a universal 
pension would eliminate present issues concerning 
men and women not satisfying qualifying conditions for 
pensions and the well documented problems with average 
contribution test for purposes of satisfying entitlement 
to the main flat-rate state pension. This would be of 
immediate benefit to the cohort of women (and men) 
most disadvantaged in pensions terms, by present and 
historical anomalies. It also provides immediate redress 
for those who have suffered historical discrimination in 
the labour market and social welfare system.
 
Ethic of care. Such a payment is paid to everyone without 
recognising periods of care and/or paid employment in 
the Irish state. In this way it is neutral regarding care and 
does not punish those who have spent significant periods 
caring. However, if it is considered desirable to publicly 
reward such care work and other forms of socially useful 
participation, it is possible to develop a ‘participation 
style’ comprehensive income guarantee scheme which 
awards the income for the very fact of caring. 
Adequacy. In order for this to be meaningful it should 
be adequate enough not only to lift people from poverty 
but to guarantee a decent quality of life. Although it is 
possible to offer such a payment at a lower level (a partial 
basic income or minimum income approach) this partial 
approach does not fare as well against some of the core 
pension reform principles outlined earlier in this report. 
The appropriateness and adequacy of payment rates is 
always a matter of political debate and recent debates 
have set the range at between 40% GAIE and 50% GAIE 
(McCashin 2006). Whatever the adequacy benchmark, the 
key policy is the indexation mechanism used to upgrade 
the pension to keep pace with average living standards.
Chapter One reflected how, of the liberal regimes, 
Canada and NZ offer the best examples of pension first-
tier adequacy but while NZ indexes to wage increases 
Canada indexes only to prices. New Zealand is therefore 
more likely than Canada to maintain adequacy over a 
time period. Uprating and indexation must allow for 
women’s longer life span and, as a matter of principle 
avoid actuarial calculations. The aim should be to ensure a 
secured, predictable and adequate income for senior life. 
An adequacy benchmark of 50% Net Average Industrial 
Earnings would ensure quality of life and also ensure the 
pension income standard would increase in line with 
average living standards and earnings.
This form of non-means-tested pension has capacity to 
encourage savings over the life time and so encourage self 
responsible provision. It also enables people to liquidify 
property and other assets and so overcomes the asset 
rich – income poor paradox of many of Ireland’s senior 
population. It also has the added advantage of bringing 
more mobility into the housing market and allowing 
people to trade up and down over the life cycle thereby 
augmenting the pension. 
Sustainability, equity and distribution. Sustainability 
is a key challenge for any pension system. McCashin 
(2006) and Hughes (2007) estimates the combination of 
present and future social assistance and social insurance 
schemes to achieve virtually full levels of state pension 
coverage (98% by 2020). The cost of a comprehensive 
income guarantee scheme is therefore not likely to be 
prohibitive. This is especially the case given there are 
less administration costs and control resources required 
for a universal pension (Willmore 2003;5). The savings in 
administration, generally estimated to be 4% of the total 
cost, would easily cover the extra 2% coverage. 
The sustainability of any such scheme would clearly be 
dependent on the level of adequacy or generosity of the 
universal payment. Callan (2006) observes that the cost of 
achieving pension adequacy in the present pension system 
could be met by standard rating pension tax reliefs. This 
would also achieve greater equity in overall distributive 
terms (Hughes 2007). 
Progressive distribution outcomes can be achieved by 
making such payments taxable. The way of maximising 
equity or progressive distribution outcomes is income 
testing through the tax system. Given little desirability 
in maintaining the current means-tested system, a 
progressive income distribution (a targeted aspect to 
a first-tier pension), if considered necessary, can be 
achieved by introducing an alterative form of means 
testing at the other end of the spectrum by, for example, 
withdrawing a portion of the value of the universal 
pension through the tax system. Willmore (2003) argues 
that it is possible to recover some of the cost of universal 
pensions from the rich with a moderate surcharge on their 
taxable income which could apply until the pension is fully 
or partially recovered.
Crucially it also encourages people to work longer into 
retirement or to only semi-retire. This contributes to 
maximising labour market participation, a key part of 
the overall pension sustainability strategy. In the context 
of the need to control for possible inward migration 
incentives for people near retirement age, most countries 
operate a residency requirement with a full universal 
pension requiring up to 50 years residence (NL) but usually 
40 years (Denmark and Finland). Migrants and expatriots 
are accommodated by allowing 1/40th of pension for each 
year of residence.
First tier – maintaining a means-tested system 
Amaryta Sen (1995:12) discusses four major social costs 
of means testing; disutility and stigma, informational 
distortion, incentive distortion and administrative and 
invasive losses, as well as significant poverty, employment 
and asset liquidity traps. While some of these traps can 
be mitigated by tapering and careful design, Sen and 
others have long established the superiority of universal 
schemes over means-tested schemes from gender and 
anti-poverty perspectives (Willmore, 2003). Such means-
tested systems are best kept as residual features of the 
social welfare system (NESC, 2002). While there is a clear 
need for continuing reform of social assistance (NESF, 
2001), it is better to strive for as many people as possible 
to be covered through the social insurance system (NESC, 
2002). If the comprehensive income guarantee system is 
not considered desirable, then there is the challenge of 
achieving maximum poverty alleviation and individual 
entitlement in a resource-tested social welfare scheme. 
Means-tested reforms to enable  
greater entitlement
Given that the more targeted the scheme the less effective 
it is in reducing poverty, it makes sense to think of 
reforming the present means-tested system away from 
the testing of ‘means’ and more towards the testing of 
‘income’, thus pitching the test at a higher level and 
making it more likely to bring more people, and especially 
more women, into entitlement. 
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14  It argued that high tax rates required to fund a universal working age adult approach mean that it will be unaffordable, impractical and politically unfeasible. Such tax 
rates will also have uncertain labour market implications and may cause work disincentives and increased participation in the informal economy. The NWCI have also 
argued that a basic income option for working age may reinforce gender-differentiated approaches to care and housework.
15 This model is also used in Maurtitis, Nepal, South Africa, Nambia and Botswana.
Means-tested reforms to enable greater  
economic autonomy 
In a male breadwinner model, carers’ payments are still 
within the context of a male breadwinner model of social 
welfare regime, where the woman is defined in terms 
of the status of her relationship with her husband and 
can only access derived rights acquired by individuals 
on the basis of their relationship to someone who has 
acquired direct rights,16 and when they satisfy some type 
of contingency and are paid as a portion of the spouse or 
partner’s payment.
Derived rights should have no place in a feminist pensions 
system. Greater economic autonomy can be achieved 
by moving towards fuller individualisation even, within 
means-tested rules. There are particular obstacles to 
achieving full individualisation in the context of means-
test and there are particular disadvantages of means 
testing from a gender perspective. Means-tested schemes 
tend to be household administered schemes. They are 
means-tested on household earnings and paid on a head 
of household basis, and therefore don’t offer autonomy 
and financial independence. However, even in the context 
of household means tests there are reforms that can be 
made to the present system of Irish means tests. These 
are discussed under three headings; administrative 
individualisation, limitation rule and changes to the 
household means test formula. 
a)  Administrative individualisation 
 The 2002 Programme for Government committed 
to Administrative Individualisation for Contributory 
Old Age Pensions. Budget 2008 finally introduced full 
rate adult payments for both partners and a default 
administrative individualisation was introduced 
for all newcomers in 2008. There are, however, 
administrative and legal issues in maintaining this 
position and obstacles to making it the default option 
for all COAP’s. Government need to restate their 
commitment to this policy and remove remaining 
obstacles to its full implementation.
Where both adults are in receipt of non-contributory 
old age pension (NCOAP), two full adult payments 
are already paid to the household. The default option 
for this should be to administer individualised equal 
payments to couples where both are eligible for NCOAP. 
b) Limitation rule 
 A significant obstacle to direct rights in the present 
Irish system is the limitation rule where certain 
couples are paid a collective of 1.7 times the adult 
payment rather than two separate full adult 
payments. This limitation rule causes difficulty 
for women under the age of 66 and married to or 
cohabiting with an old age pension recipient. This 
provision undermines the financial advantage older 
but non-pension-aged women may have in claiming 
a payment in their own right and makes it less likely 
these women will seek a payment in their own right. 
In addition, by not claiming in their own right, these 
people, mainly women, in turn are not recognised 
as part of the labour force and can be excluded 
from a range of subsequent employment schemes 
and training programmes, participation in which is 
dependent on the live register. In order for present 
qualified adults to qualify in their own right for a 
household means-tested payment, the limitation rule 
needs to be abolished. 
c) Changes to the household means test formula 
 to maximise economic autonomy
 Millar (2003) and McLaughlin (2002) outlined the 
main aspects of a fully individualised social security 
system.17 Full abolition of household means testing is 
unlikely to be a politically viable option for general 
social security reform, and given the regressive 
income distribution it would give rise to it does not 
pass greater distributional or antipoverty principles. 
Gender equality outcomes can be promoted by 
reducing to the maximum degree possible women’s 
financial dependency within the family. 
Millar (2002) proposes restructuring to enable 
an individual claim in a partially individualised 
means test where the claim covers the needs of just 
the claimant and the award is paid directly to the 
claimant. Various changes made to Irish household 
means-testing rules are already moving in this 
direction. Further progress adjusting Irish means-
testing formula would maximise the number of 
women in low income households to qualify in their 
own right for such payments, even if these payments 
are household means-tested and do not always 
amount to the maximum payment. 
Second tier - Income replacement 
 
A Mandatory state earnings-related social 
insurance system 
Social insurance has significant political and popular 
support in Ireland. This system rewards those who engage 
in work through paid employment. In a more limited 
way the social insurance system also acknowledges 
other socially useful work including child and elder care 
and voluntary work overseas. The biggest reward for 
participation is built into the core feature of state social 
insurance, that the state is willing to take its share of the 
risk alongside the employer and the employee or person 
insured. The risk of pension investment is underscored by 
the state and not solely by the individual as in the case of 
voluntary pension schemes. This is an important principle 
in the context of increasingly volatile global financial 
markets and less secure working lives. 
NESC (1999), NESC (2002), and the Programme for Prosperity 
and Fairness (2000) endorsed enhancement of the social 
insurance scheme. This approach to pension reform has 
been supported by gender equality academics. McLaughlin 
(1999) states that: ‘it will be clear that my own view is that 
careful extension and expansion of the social insurance 
system offers the most feasible route to individualisation 
over the next 20 years.” A previous minister Dermot 
Ahern (September 2001) broadly supported a direction of 
social security reform to improve the financial position of 
women and enhance the possibility for women to achieve 
economic independence. Chapter One concluded how 
mandatory state earnings-related pensions are good for 
women and low income workers. They have the advantage 
of defined benefit structure, the state underwriting the 
risk and the capacity to incorporate credits for caring 
or other periods of interruption of working life. When 
compared to voluntary or mandatory private schemes, 
mandatory state earnings schemes are far superior on 
gender and redistributive grounds. 
Economic autonomy. A system based on individualised 
social insurance records is in effect an individualised 
system. With a universal first tier of individualised 
pensions there would be no need for qualified adult 
payments or for means testing of qualified adult 
contributory payments. In effect the outcome would be 
a fully individualised pension system. This eliminates 
questions of pension rights on the basis of sexual 
orientation or alternative forms of living together. 
Depending on the degree to which basic needs are met in 
the universal pension, the primary function of the social 
insurance pension could shift from income adequacy and 
towards income replacement. 
Income replacement. Introducing an income 
replacement function into the Irish social insurance 
system requires amending the present flat rate scheme 
into a tiered income replacement function. Such a 
mandatory social insurance scheme could, for example, 
include a minimum payment. The scale and adequacy 
of this minimum payment would very much depend 
on whether it was supplementing an adequate first-
tier universal payment or whether, in the absence of a 
universal adequate payment, it was in effect necessary and 
fundamental to meeting he principle of adequacy.
Any subsequent tiered system with an earnings-related 
aspect of the pension could be administered through three 
earnings bands, A, B, and C, with the payments designed 
to fulfil an income replacement function of up to a certain 
percentage of the average industrial wage. While Irish  
pay-related benefits were fully abolished in 1994, it is 
possible to redesign the current scheme to include a  
pay-related aspect. Recent social insurance reforms to 
include part-time workers in unemployment and disability 
benefits introduced a pay-related graded tier of payments. 
We estimate that there will be no cost to the exchequer 
when the lost revenue to tax incentives on present 
voluntary income replacement pension schemes is  
factored into the system. The administrative system 
is already in place for such a mandatory system and 
with increasing use of information technology is now 
considerably more effective. 
Ethic of Care. The framework for a mandatory social 
insurance system is already in place but to date it has 
not adequately compensated for gender differentials 
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16 Direct rights are acquired by an individual on the basis of residency and satisfying some type of contingency (as in a universal scheme) or on the basis of contributions  
 and satisfying some type of contingency for which they have paid into the social security system (as in an individualised mandatory social insurance scheme)
17 Each person would have an individual right to claim financial support and no one would be able to claim financial support for another adult. The award would cover the 
needs of that individual only and would not include any payment for other adults in the household. Payments would be made directly to the individual. In a means-tested 
system a fully individualised system would assess financial means on an individual rather than a household basis and without taking it into account the resources or other 
income of any adults residing in that household.
in relation to care and labour market experiences. 
Proposals to iron out gender discrimination are discussed 
immediately below. While recognising that any earnings-
related system will discriminate against women, it is a 
primary function of pensions to provide income support 
and it is difficult to avoid a relationship between income 
support and previous earnings. However, there are 
some mitigating design features that can maximise the 
compensation for care periods and minimise the fall-
out from periods of disruption to working life for care. 
Tuominen and Laitinen-Kuikka (2003) observe that, in 
countries like Ireland with strong male breadwinner 
legacies, womens’ employment patterns may equate to 
little more than two thirds of men. Compensating for this 
significant shortfall is therefore necessary in the structural 
design of the social insurance qualification criteria. 
For women with childcare responsibilities, full 
interruption in paid work implies a dramatic impact on 
life time earning and therefore on pension accrual. As 
a rule of thumb, according to Tuominen and Laitinen-
Kuikka (2003), for every five-year break there is a 1.5 to 2 
years loss of earnings per year of interruption. A ten-year 
break may therefore translate into a 15-20% wage drop. 
This is observed in the gender pay gap. Ginn (2001) adds 
that because part-time work choices tend to be exercised 
over the same years that women are in the prime earnings 
years, the opportunity cost of that part-time work is high. 
Leitners, (2001) detailed analysis of pension systems 
from a gender perspective allows us to make some 
key observations about what may or may not work in 
designing a second-tier mandatory social insurance 
pension. There is significant variation in how different 
countries design (consciously or unconsciously) structural 
gender discrimination into or out of the design of pension 
systems. Most pension systems do, however, systematically 
treat women differently to men and reflect gendered 
assumptions about the social risks of work and care-
oriented protection. 
The principal mechanisms for differentiating men 
and women are earnings-related systems which have 
traditionally rewarded men’s occupational patterns and 
payments that maintain gendered division of care labour 
in the family. Understanding how specific design details 
facilitate unequal gender outcomes helps us understand 
how to avoid structural design features that lead to 
inequality. On the other hand, understanding how equal 
outcomes can be facilitated by pension systems helps us 
identity what is required of good pension policy. 
Lietner (2001) examined best practice in constructing, 
access conditions, qualifying contributions and benefit 
calculation. She observes that certain access conditions 
can deny women entry when they require a minimum 
duration of insurance coverage to be eligible or when 
they require minimum hours/earnings per week to be in 
contribution. Regarding eligibility, the longer the period 
on which benefits are based the smaller the benefit base 
in general, the higher the number of years considered for 
full eligibility purposes the more the system rewards men 
over women. Long benefit calculation periods, requiring 
significant years of coverage, advantage continuously 
high earning labour market careers which are found 
more often among men than women. Not all Irish access, 
eligibility and benefit calculation rules conform to best 
practice in gender-sensitive pensions design. A 40-year 
pension norm coverage does not reflect interruption 
of working life for childbirth, and this labour market 
disadvantage is reflected in level of pension. The smaller 
the required working life the better from a woman’s 
point of view. There is a need consequently to reform 
access, qualifying conditions and benefit calculation 
rules for social insurance-based pensions so that, as far 
as possible, pensions policy takes into account women’s 
inferior earnings over the life course and accommodates, 
recognises and values care.
From her assessment it is possible to develop the following 
as guidelines for best practice:
 
Access
– allowing part-time workers access (Ireland presently  
 allows access to those working eight hours or more), 
– avoiding minimum income thresholds for entry to  
 social insurance. 
– easy re-entry after periods of disruption 
Eligibility
– short time spans for minimum entitlement
– moving away from average contribution test to a  
 shorter time span for testing contributions, 
– moving away from rewarding ‘maximum number of  
 years’ contribution records 
– allowing for a ‘best of‘ rule over shorter periods that  
 allows the most beneficial period to be chosen for  
 pension assessment contribution periods
Benefit Calculation 
– avoiding averaging over ‘last’ years of employment  
 when the gender pay gap can be more pronounced 
– having tiered gradual movements across  
 contributions-based entitlements and across  
 averaged earnings 
Adequacy, sustainability, equity and redistribution. 
From a gender standpoint an enhanced first-tier 
comprehensive pension guarantee by the state 
automatically achieves greater redistribution. However 
any second-tier pension system that is earnings-related 
will not necessarily be redistributive and may indeed 
widen gender income differentials. However it is possible 
to build more progressive income outcomes into an 
earnings-related social insurance scheme by, using the 
guidelines above, paying fine attention to the design 
details concerning access, eligibility and benefit calculation 
rules. While principles informing appropriateness and 
adequacy of payment rates and levels would need to 
be assessed on income replacement principles ,there is 
still room for redistributive principles and for building 
progressive rather than regressive income replacement 
outcomes into such a scheme. In other words, it is possible 
to skew mandatory social insurance pay- related towards 
low-paid to the advantage of women. There is also the 
advantage of portability of state mandatory schemes and 
the fact that they can easily accommodate or include self-
employed and atypical workers, many of whom are women 
(Nash 2006).
Retrospective pension justice – Highlighting the  
legacy of the male breadwinner. 
Lewis (2003) highlights the cumulative effects of class, 
gender, race and ethnicity on education and social 
redistribution in the context of the historically developed 
system based on the male breadwinner systems. The legacy 
of the male breadwinner lives on in structural features 
of social security, pensions and employment which 
militate against full pension equality for women. The path 
dependency of the male breadwinner system continues to 
create pension inequities. 
• Older women, who were forced to leave employment 
to spend their lives caring for their families due 
to the marriage bar, are now facing a situation of 
no entitlement to pension in their own right, or 
significantly reduced pensions;
• While women are increasingly able to acquire 
direct pension rights on the basis of their own PRSI 
contributions, there are still a significant number 
of women (60,000 in 2006) who only have derived 
rights to their pension: that is, they must acquire the 
pension through their husbands.
• The Homemakers Scheme which the Government 
introduced in 1994 was a piecemeal measure which 
will not assist women coming to pension age now, 
and for younger women will ‘disregard’ their years in 
care work ,which is demeaning for women and will 
certainly not attract men to take up the provision; 
• Women who have worked on family farms and 
in family businesses also do not have social insurance 
coverage, which means that they are totally reliant 
on their husbands in older age.
• Women who have worked in part-time, casual and 
seasonal employment also have broken social 
insurance records and are at higher risk of poverty. 
The Pensions Board have highlighted the low levels of 
coverage for lower paid and part-time workers, who 
are predominately women.
• Loss of independence and dignity, feelings of being 
a burden and embarrassment at surviving on an 
inadequate state pension is the experience of many 
older women
• Higher levels of poverty are traditionally experienced 
by older women .
There are two, not necessarily related, questions here: 
 
(1) how to address retrospectively past injustice for groups 
of Irish women at or near pension age and 
(2) how to avoid future pension injustice in the present 
working generations. 
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It is worth noting that immediate implementation  
of a comprehensive minimum income guarantee  
would meet both women’s needs for adequacy and 
individual entitlement. 
Re evaluating how to value care in the  
social insurance system. In the absence of such a scheme, 
the Irish state has to re-examine how it has treated 
periods of care so that women who previously spent long 
periods of time caring for others and women who will do 
so in the future will have this care valued and recognised. 
This means reviewing how Irish care credits are currently 
structured. Clearly, awarding credits of equal value to paid 
contributions is the most effective way to equalise periods 
spent caring with periods of paid employment, and is the 
strongest form or acknowledgement and compensation 
for care work.
An existing 1994 homemaker’s scheme caters for people 
who spend periods of time – up to a maximum of 20 years 
– outside the labour force caring either for children or  
for incapacitated people. It works by ‘disregarding’ time 
spent caring when calculating a person’s contributory  
old-age pension entitlement. When the person’s 
contribution record is averaged, the disregard increases 
the likelihood of achieving eligibility criteria for the 
contributory pension. 
This can be distinguished from a credit which would 
be added to a person’s contribution record before the 
average contribution was calculated. A credit rather than 
disregard option was originally considered and rejected 
at the time of introduction of the homemaker’s scheme, 
mainly on the grounds of cost. Since then, the 1999 
Expenditure Review of Credited Contributions considered this 
issue, as did the Review of Qualifying Contributions for the 
old-age contributory and retirement pensions. The Credits 
Expenditure Review noted that disregards gave no value 
for short-term payments and gave a slightly lower yearly 
average than if credits were awarded. It was noted that 
disregards were beneficial for some homemakers because 
they were not affected by the S.57 SI 312 1996 rule, where 
a person with no SI record for more than two years must 
have 26 paid contributions before credits can be awarded. 
Notwithstanding the latter difficulty, the 1999 review 
concluded that it would be useful to see if disregards and 
credits could be managed within a single arrangement. 
The Review of Qualifying Contributions was largely satisfied 
that the proposal for a switch from disregards to credits 
was warranted. The question of converting these 
disregards to a system of credits was considered in the 
second phase of the Review of Qualifying Contributions 
for old-age contributory pensions and the review was 
positively disposed towards managing the homemaker’s 
pension by way of credits rather than disregards. 
This logical conclusion is to value women’s 
care work as a contribution (rather than being 
disregarded) and support the proposals to move 
from a disregard to a credit. 
The scheme is available, however, only to women 
registered as homemakers since 1994, to women whose 
children are under 12 or are in need of full-time care 
because of a disability. It does not extend to women 
required to give up work due to the marriage bar which 
operated until 1973. There have been consistent demands 
to apply the scheme retrospectively to 1973. The Review 
of Qualifying Contributions is broadly supportive of 
retrospection. However, it also notes the financial 
implications of greater pension costs and the difficulty 
of deciding a retrospection date; the administrative 
implications of the retrospective application of the 1994 
scheme; the difficulty of ascertaining whether a person 
was in a care position for all of these years. 
In addition, there are fears of false expectations being 
raised, as many of the women will still not qualify for 
pensions because they will not have had prior paid 
contributions. It raises what is probably the most serious 
obstacle to reform: maintaining the logic of the social 
insurance principle and the difficulty in finding a balance 
or a parity of treatment between full-time ‘contributors’ 
and those on credits. The following is supported by the 
National Council on Ageing and Older People. Costs made 
available in 2007 suggest that this would be in the region 
of 150m per annum (DOF 2007). 
The 1994 homemaker’s scheme should be awarded 
retrospectively to 1973 and relevant women 
attributed the maximum 20 years allowed for under 
the homemaker’s scheme.
In the context of a move from disregards to credits and 
towards retrospective credits, the Review of Qualifying 
Contributions is very important (especially given the need 
to safeguard the viability of the social insurance scheme). 
Phase one of the review recommended a switch 
from a yearly average calculation to a total number 
of contributions (paid and credited) calculation, this 
needs to be assessed from a gender perspective to 
see if such a move mitigates against women.
There are clear issues for women in the degree to which 
the review strikes a balance between valuing paid 
contributions over credited contributions and in the 
number of minimum paid contributions required to 
qualify in the first instance. 
The number of paid contributions required to qualify 
will increase from 260 to 520 in 2010. This is largely 
acceptable and in line with European norms but 
should not be further increased. Recommendations 
arising from phase two of the Review of Qualifying 
Contributions recommendations should be the 
subject of a gender impact assessment. 
In Germany care credits are constructed to guarantee 
a minimum entitlement to a pension guaranteed by 
state. This means that there is not necessarily any paid 
contribution required to achieve a minimum state 
pension. This might be a desirable feature for pension 
reform from the perspective of Traveller, rural and some 
migrant women from ethnic communities that favour 
traditional home-based roles for women. 
Consideration should be given to allowing a number 
of care credits guarantee a minimum entitlement to 
a pension guaranteed by state.
Gender neutrality. Finally, as Tuominen and Laitinen-
Kuikka (2003:14) argue, gender neutrality needs to be a 
feature of the care credit policy. They argue ‘to be neutral 
the compensation must be high enough, otherwise it will 
not be a real alternative to men who most often are the 
highest earners in the family. They argue that even if the 
cost of a gender-neutral care credit might be higher it also 
means a more positive balance in labour market and care 
participation between men and women. It is important 
to remember that, while it may appear ironic, a generous 
approach to crediting care has the added advantage of 
encouraging women back into the labour market. Making 
a pension easier to attain actually motivates women to 
return to work. 
Caution needs to be exercised that this does not reinforce 
women’s traditional care roles. A gender-neutral approach 
to facilitating ‘parental leave’ is required as well as 
stronger statutory rights facilitating leave for family 
reasons, including elder care. There are different degrees 
to which they are designed with other paternal rights to 
be accessible to men, but Sweden, for example, requires 
a proportion of parental leave to be forfeited if not taken 
up by the father. Pension care credits should also be 
constructed in a way that enables choice to remain in 
the labour market. France, the UK, Germany and Austria, 
for example require interruption in working life to take 
maternal benefits, this is not conducive to choice or 
s,haring between genders. The system for elder care also 
needs to reformed so that women are not locked into 
caring roles for long periods of time. 
Carers, supports need to be reformed into a carers, 
wage fully integrated into the social insurance 
system. In the absence of this, family or other  
carers on state-funded caring schemes need to  
be fully credited.
Pension splitting. An alternative approach to achieve 
gender pension equity is to statutorily require pension 
splitting. With increased levels of divorce and remarriage 
it has become necessary to have a fair way of rectifying 
inequality in pension provision between both partners in 
a marriage. In Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland it is 
mandatory to split equally the pensions of both spouses. 
Third tier – Private pensions
The function of income replacement can be met by 
a voluntary or mandatory private pension savings 
system or a mandatory state earnings-related social 
insurance system. The Green Paper makes a strong and 
convincing argument that the present voluntary private 
tax-supported pensions system is both unsustainable 
and, from a gender and anti-poverty perspective, 
ineffective. Then it is somewhat illogical to make an 
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unequal, regressive, ineffective and unsustainable scheme 
mandatory. There seems little if any real rationale, from 
a gender or poverty pensions perspective, for providing 
regressive, costly and ultimately ineffective tax incentives 
for voluntary pension saving when the other option of 
a combined universal first tier and the mandatory state 
income replacement pensions scheme appear to meet all 
the relevant principles for pension reform. 
This section therefore makes no argument for a tax-
supported voluntary scheme; rather it seeks to draw 
out the gender and anti-poverty relevant aspects of this 
pension debate.  
Voluntary system of private pensions
There will always be a voluntary private market pension 
scheme. However, as Tuominen and Laitinen-Kuikka 
(2003) observe, emphasising these as a route for pensions 
means promoting a route that leads to discriminatory 
outcomes for women. The policy debate here is whether 
there is any real rationale from a gender and anti-poverty 
perspective for providing tax incentives for voluntary 
pension saving. As expenditure foregone on tax incentives 
impacts on revenue available for investment in the 
statutory aspects of pension provision, there is no logical 
argument, on any of the principles outlined to inform this 
pension study, to proceed with voluntary tax reliefs at the 
expense of strengthening that statutory provision.  
Economic autonomy. Given that women are less likely 
to be working and less likely to be working in full-time 
employment, there is no sense in which voluntary private 
pension provision is likely to maximise routes to economic 
autonomy for women. 
Ethic of care. The literature review in Chapter 1 makes it 
clear that private voluntary pension provision is the least 
favourable to women and has no real role in a women-
friendly pension system (Ginn, 2001). Gough (2001:312) 
argues that the method of calculation used to determine 
the benefits offered by the majority of pension schemes 
works against the career patterns of most women. The 
gender pay gap into and out of occupational pensions is 
therefore substantial. Ginn (2004) makes a convincing 
argument about the unequal privatisation effect of private 
pension schemes which fail to incorporate allowances for 
periods of unpaid caring work over the life cycle. 
Adequacy. Non-mandatory voluntary pensions are 
problematic from a risk perspective. In an environment of 
global economic turbulence and recent exposure of severe 
risk in financial markets, they create a produce where in 
the defined contribution produce the full risk is borne 
by the investor. This introduces vulnerability as a factor 
which needs to be taken into account when discussing 
adequacy. The security of having a guaranteed income 
is crucial for many families, and many lone parents 
are reluctant to part with the security of a guaranteed 
independent income (Murphy 2003, 2008). O Donnell  
& Arup (2001) argue that claimants value the stability  
of a regular though lower income flow over what it  
may be theoretically possible to earn from employment  
or investment. 
The costs of Defined Contribution private pensions 
include the front loading of administrative charges, 
disproportionately higher administrative charges for 
smaller accounts and discriminatory annuity rates.  
There are also the problems associated with annuity 
structures for those with longer longevity (typically 
women). It is worth observing here, for example, that 
the Netherlands (COM 2002:90) have introduced a law 
which mandates private pension companies using defined 
contribution schemes to apply a unisex rule to averaging 
which equalises the amount paid to men and women 
(Tuominen and Laitinen-Kuikka (2003:15). 
Sustainability, Equity and redistributive justice. 
So far we have pointed in the direction of a model built on 
a universal tax-funded payment-related to residence or 
participation in care and/or employment and a mandatory 
state income-related social insurance contributory 
scheme with potential for women-friendly provisions such 
as childcare credits. We assume, voluntary private market 
pension schemes will remain, but argue that there are  
no sound rational policy reasons for supporting these  
with tax incentives. 
Redistribution of the cost of tax incentives for private 
pensions (presently 2.9 billion per annum) will help 
fund a more progressive and adequate universal first-
tier state pension. Tax incentives could theoretically 
have a role in incentivising participation in second 
and/or third-tier schemes. However, there is no real 
role for tax incentives if the universal first tier and 
mandatory state second tier deal comprehensively with 
the key issues of individualisation, adequacy and income 
replacement. There will, of course, be a maximum cap 
on the income replacement levels in a mandatory social 
insurance scheme ,and a genuine case may be made that 
higher earners will need a state-regulated voluntary 
pension scheme to supplement the income replacement 
function of the mandatory state scheme. An argument for 
regulation is not however, an argument for tax incentives. 
If tax incentives are seen to have any role, on both 
sustainability and equity grounds, they need to be made 
less regressive by, for example, making them available 
at the standard rate or a uniform rate to all, and by 
directing their value towards the poor through refundable 
tax credits and making them available at source. 
Alternatively, if promoting private savings is considered 
a necessary pensions policy objective, the principles of 
equity require instruments that produce progressive 
rather than regressive outcomes. In the absence of 
refundable tax reliefs (the only tax mechanisms that can 
assure theoretical equity), a scheme similar to SSIAs is the 
preferable mechanism from a gender and anti-poverty 
perspective, to promote private savings. 
As discussed above, tax incentives offer little anti-poverty 
outcomes. They are costly in terms of revenue forgone. 
Hughes (2007) has demonstrated that tax incentives are 
utilised more by men, and most of all by male higher 
earners, and they are, in the context of the present Irish 
system, very regressive. 
Future reforms must mitigate the costs and the 
regressive character of these tax expenditures. If 
it is considered necessary to retain pension tax 
incentives they must be capped and only available 
at the standard or agreed nominal rate (for example 
10 or 15%) and accessible to all through a system of 
refundable tax credits.
Mandatory system of private pensions
The core pensions debate in the green paper revolves 
around the issue of whether to make mandatory the 
present voluntary system of private pensions. Hyde, 
Dixon and Drover (2004), strong advocates of a mandatory 
private pension scheme, acknowledge that women are 
disadvantaged in earnings-related schemes, public and 
private. They argue, against Ginn (2004), that while 
voluntary private schemes offer no compensatory 
mechanism to offset these disadvantages, state-mandated 
private schemes have the possibility, if political will is 
there, to prescribe that such schemes protect vulnerable 
public interests. 
While it is true technically that government can subsidise 
particular membership categories, they fail to locate one 
example where governments have chosen to subsidise 
women temporarily outside the labour market because 
of childbearing or caring responsibilities. While Dixon 
et al (2004) outline some examples of good practice in 
mandated private pension schemes, the only reference 
to accommodating care is the provision for women to 
voluntarily affiliate and pay contributions when out of 
the labour market. This proves the point that women 
in mandated private schemes are on their own. The 
possibility of social compensation for periods of care, 
while technically possible is never a political reality 
in a scheme based on individual provision rather than 
collective solidarity. 
Given the already strong equity arguments against tax-
supported voluntary private pension schemes, there is no 
rationale for mandatory tax-supported private pension 
schemes. Mandatory contributions to private schemes, 
while logically identical in purpose to mandatory state 
schemes, carry the opposite disadvantages. They are 
defined contributions, the individual carries the risk and 
there is no provision for periods of interruption of paid 
employment for caring or other reasons. 
A gender-sensitive pensions model will avoid mandated 
private pensions in favour of second-tier mandatory-
earnings related social insurance schemes. This is the case 
even if tax supports are reformed to maximise progressive 
income distribution outcomes.
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Figure 7. NWCI reform option for Irish pensions
Reform options to achieve gender-specific  
and general pension principles 
Throughout this report we have drawn attention to the 
fact that some versions of pension reform automatically 
lock in strong gender equity dimensions while some 
versions, on the other hand, embed negative outcomes 
from equity, care and individual autonomy perspectives. 
This is true at the level of structural design as well as at 
the level of regulatory detail in each scheme. From an 
anti-poverty perspective, for example, third-tier private 
pension schemes make no contribution to pension 
adequacy and are, therefore, a low priority for public 
investment and have little place in a pro-woman model of 
pension reform. Rather, as Ginn (2001, 2004) concluded, 
there is an obvious default model for pension reform 
that maximises both gender equality and anti-poverty 
outcomes. This default model embeds gender equality 
objectives into the structural design of the pension model. 
The NWCI will advocate this structure for Irish pensions. 
The following section develops this structure by charting 
what is required in Figure 7 and then outlines in more 
detail policy terms to achieve the main outcomes required 
of this model of pension reform. Where relevant a time 
scale is indicated. 
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Detailed recommendations and relevant time lines
Comprehensive Pension Guarantee 
– Make adequacy the core function of first-tier pensions
– Introduce an adequate universal pension for all over 66 and resident in Ireland for a minimum 
 of ten years with a value of 1/40th pension for each year of residency. 
This would require a considerable lead-in time for full implementation, but a decision in  
principle to move in this direction could then guide other more immediate reform options 
Means-tested recommendations 
The means-testing system needs comprehensive reform to ensure maximum coverage and maximum 
level of individual entitlement within a partial household resource test. 
a) Full individualisation of household-based old age non-contributory pensions 
b) Introduction of means-tested parental allowance as discussed in DSFA (2006).
c) Abolition of the limitation rule and the qualified adult allowance and changes to the household 
 means test formula to maximise economic autonomy
e) Reform of carers allowance/benefit to a ‘wage’, facilitating care of older and infirm people to be 
 valued as paid work 
f) Information campaigns, administrative changes and resources to ensure consistency in 
 regional application of guidelines, so each adult is exercising their full potential to be a 
 claimant in their own right.
All of these are already live policy options and some have already been under detailed examination 
and are fully costed. Subject to administrative resources being made available these options could be 
fully implemented within two years.
Social Insurance recommendations 
Introduce an income replacement function into social insurance and introduce a gender-sensitive 
income replacement function into social insurance old age contributory pension by
a) Ensuring maximum eligibility by ensuring short time spans for minimum entitlement, moving 
 away from average contribution test to a shorter time span for testing contributions, moving  
 away from rewarding ‘maximum number of years’ contribution records and allowing for a  
 ‘best of ‘ rule over shorter periods that allows the most beneficial period to be chosen for  
 pension assessment contribution periods
b) Ensure that benefit calculation advantages women by avoiding averaging over ‘last’ years  
 of employment when the gender pay gap can be more pronounced,and having tiered gradual  
 movements across contribution- based entitlements and across averaged earnings
c) Maximise access by enable easy re-entry after periods of disruption by reforming the  
 S.57 SI 312 1996 rule, where a person with no SI record for more than two years must have  
 26 paid contributions before credits can be awarded, and amend social insurance contribution  
 rules to enable relatives assisting, including spouses of self-employed and farmers, to be  
 insured as employees
d) Accommodate care and address previous pension injustice by reforming homemakers’  
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 disregards into credits and awarding these retrospectively from 1973. 
e) Promote a gender-neutral care ethic by introducing paid parental leave benefit for parents  
 of young children
f) Acknowledge the previous injustice of the ‘marriage bar’ with a once-off ring-fenced  
 retrospective scheme
While a decision to incorporate an income replacement function into the social insurance system 
would take some time to consider, and at least a five-year time period to implement, most other 
social insurance recommendations could be achieved within a two-year period. 
Voluntary pension recommendations 
a) There are various tax reforms that could bring greater equity and more progressive income 
distribution outcomes. These range from full abolition of tax relief for private pensions to 
restricting such relief to standard rate relief, introducing more stringent caps on the use of 
reliefs and APFs and making tax refundable all pension tax relief 
b) Examine options for a non-regressive non-tax-based pension promotion tool – like SSIA – 
 and make it progressively more beneficial for lower and non-earners 
c) Encourage credits unions, MABS or financial regulator to introduce a state-backed low-charges  
 produce for low income earners
d) Regulate to require unisex life plans and pension splitting
While developing alternative approaches to promoting private savings could take a number of years, 
the fiscal reform advocated to bring about greater distributional equity could be enacted over a 
period of annual budgets. Regulation for unisex life tables and pension splitting could be achieved 
within two years.
Governance issues in Irish Pensions
It is a key objective of this report to bring a gender 
dimension to the Irish pension debate. This cannot be 
done without gendering the governance systems that 
debate and make decisions about Irish pension reform. 
The Irish political culture based on strong patriarchal 
values (O’Connor 2008; Yeates, 2003; McLaughlin, 2001) 
has influenced both the policy process and the policy 
content. As O’Connor and Murphy (2008) observe, lack 
of gender equality participation in all aspects of the 
Irish policy-making community (political, bureaucratic, 
corporatist, Church and academic) is a significant obstacle 
to gender-related social security reform’s progression. 
Women require a critical mass to reinforce points made by 
individual women. Cousins (2005), notes how women play 
an important agency role in the development of the social 
security system. It is crucial then that the Irish women’s 
movement, as an actor in the pension policy community, 
responds to the challenge of engaging in pension debate.
Pressure for Irish pension reform has been significant. 
However, as discussed in Chapter One, there has 
been little gendering of the pension debate. Debate is 
instead stakeholder-driven and like other elite-driven 
privatisation policy processes (Chari and McMahon 2003) 
largely dominated by the representatives of private 
industry, in this case the pension industry. All pension 
systems, public and private, voluntary and mandatory, 
require governance arrangements that enable transparent 
and accountable management and regulation of such key 
resources. There are gender and anti-poverty dimensions 
to governance in terms of equal participation and policy 
proofing systems. Pension governance needs to be 
accountable, transparent and equitable. 
Recommendations for future pension governance. 
• That the Pensions Board membership be augmented
 with a specific NWCI representative.
• That all Pensions Board publications undergo a 
published gender-proofing exercise and all Pensions 
Board data be gender disaggregated. That Pensions 
Board commission qualitative and quantitative 
research to fill data gaps regarding women and 
pensions, this should include a gender impact 
assessment of the distribution outcomes of pensions 
tax reliefs.
• Given the focus on Social Insurance in the 
development of Irish pensions, it is necessary to 
enhance social insurance governance. This could 
be done by establishing a National Social Insurance 
Board with membership from the social partners and 
specific membership for NWCI.
• There is a need for a specific review mechanism 
for Benchmarking and indexation mechanisms for 
child, working aged adult and pensions. A process 
should be agreed to ensure a regular five-year  
review mechanism.
• The NWCI recommends that this report be examined 
by the Oireachtas Committee on Women’s Affairs and 
within the implementation structures of the National 
Women’s Strategy.
The NWCI as a social partner is committed to pursuing 
this pension reform agenda through social partnership 
and ensuring a gender analysis is incorporated into the 
evolving Developmental Welfare State framework which 
underpins the ten year Towards 2016 national agreement. 
Two aspects of this framework are critical to pensions. It 
will be necessary to ensure that the life cycle approach 
to policy is able to incorporate the reality of cumulative 
disadvantage that women (and others) experience across 
their life cycles. Of the three overlapping policy domains 
noted in the Developmental Welfare State, the relationship 
between income supports and public services is crucial. 
The more public services are adequate to the task of 
securing quality of life the less pressure there is on first-
tier pension adequacy. The inverse is also true. 
Conclusion
This report sought to gender Irish pensions debate and to 
develop practical pension reform options from a gender 
and anti-poverty perspective. It has argued for a default 
reform option, a First-Tier Comprehensive Pension 
Guarantee combined with a default reform option for 
Second Tier pensions – a Mandatory Social Insurance 
with an income replacement function and a strong 
accommodation of a care ethic, a principle of economic 
autonomy and built-in mechanisms to compensate for 
the gender inequalities experienced in the working life of 
women. The report discussed some of the reforms needed 
to the present social welfare and tax systems (presented 
in summary form above). Recognising that the preferred 
NWCI reform options may not be governments’ option, 
the report also engages what is required to maximise 
the gender equality and anti-poverty dimensions and 
more fully incorporate an ethic of care and principles of 
economic autonomy into a remaining first-tier means-
tested and social insurance pension regimes. 
The report argues strongly against tax-supported 
voluntary savings approaches to pensions, and argues 
that there are regressive anti-poverty and gender equality 
outcomes from all private pension savings schemes and 
especially from mandatory schemes. It argues that, at 
the very least, voluntary private pensions should only be 
accompanied by standard rated tax relief and that this 
should be capped and that alternative, more progressive 
and equitable, mechanisms to promote private savings 
should be investigated. The absolute priority, from 
a gender and anti-poverty perspective, is however 
investing available public resources in universal and social 
insurance approaches to pension provision. This will not 
happen without ensuring that governance mechanisms for 
Irish pensions facilitates Irish women’s voices to be heard 
clearly in Irish pension debate.
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APPENDIX A
Equality assessment 
A basic equality assessment shows serious limitations in the present model of pensions for people with disabilities, 
non-nationals and Traveller communities and especially for women in these communities. The proposed reform will 
not totally resolve the barriers to accessing social insurance coverage for groups which, for different reasons, have 
inadequate access to employment, and related inadequate exposure to social insurance. 
However, an adequate universal first-tier scheme will go a considerable way to ensuring that everyone, including groups 
facing structural labour market or other discrimination, has access to a basic social welfare payment adequate to basic 
needs and participation. While the general nature of social assistance payments can cause problems like stigma and 
unemployment traps for all recipients, the lack of independent entitlement to social assistance payments can cause  
much more extreme problems for women trapped in violent relationships. Therefore a universal approach for first tier  
of pensions can only be welcomed from an equality perspective 
Marital status 
Divorce 
In relation to divorce, Yeates (2001) points out that legislation now allows women to retain eligibility to benefit 
entitlements earned through a previous marriage. Social Welfare Bill No 2 was introduced before the divorce 
referendum in 1995. It provided for the necessary changes in the social welfare codes to ensure that no spouse would 
be disadvantaged in terms of his or her social welfare entitlement as a result of his or her legal status being changed 
from married, separated or deserted to divorced. This clear system of derived rights to social insurance benefits now 
means that, in theory at least, a number of derived claims could be made from the one contribution record. Given the 
high risk of poverty among divorced women elsewhere, the comfort factor of derived rights may have been necessary in 
encouraging the electorate to accept divorce. A social insurance model, however, now needs to find both an interim and 
a long-term way to turn these derived rights into direct rights. This is a strong motivating factor for enhancing social 
insurance individualisation and making it a woman-friendly mandatory second -tier system. 
Lone Parents 
The security of knowing there is an adequate universal payment in old age is likely to benefit lone parents and their 
children, and may give them more confidence to enter and exit new relationships.
Violent Relationships
Control of money is used as a way of entrapping women in violent relationships. Independent access to social  
assistance payments for married and cohabiting women is essential if they are to be empowered and enabled to exit 
violent relationships.
Migrants and returning emigrants 
A residence-based universal approach to first-tier pensions will have serious implications for migrants. Much depends 
on whether there are minimum residence requirements and how long they are and to what degree proportionate lengths 
result in only proportionate payments. There will also be problems with documented proof of residency. Most migrants 
enter Ireland young and have the opportunity to develop a social insurance record, but many will be working in the 
informal economy and may not enter social insurance. The role and status of women in some cultures will mean that it 
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will be difficult for women to establish and maintain a social insurance record. A special information campaign may be 
needed to inform migrants and returning emigrants of the social insurance system and the long-term implications of 
non-coverage.
Traveller Community 
There is little formal economic activity among the Traveller Community and that leads to little social insurance coverage 
and little eligibility for social insurance. This will be even more problematic for traveller women (although they tend to 
be active participants on labour market programmes and may enter the social insurance system in this way). Given that 
many travellers will enter social insurance through community employment and other labour market programmes, pre-
entry credits and targeted information campaigns will be important in this regard.
People with a disability
With a 80 per cent unemployment rate, disabled people’s access to social insurance related payments is very problematic. 
Therefore the issue of independent access to a pension guarantee is of as vital importance to this group as it is for 
women.
Sexual orientation 
The reform is likely to have positive impacts on the sexual orientation ground of equality legislation. The NWCI supports 
the extension of transferability of tax credits and social insurance and voluntary pension rights to cohabiting couples 
and same sex couples.
Poverty proofing 
Poverty proofing guidelines require the policy-maker to consider: 
• If the proposal increases the level of poverty, what options might be identified to ameliorate  
 this effect;
• If the proposal has no effect on the level of poverty, what options might be identified to  
 produce a positive effect.
This proposal, if implemented at an adequate level, will reduce the level of consistent poverty and relative poverty 
in Ireland. Implementation of the proposed model should contribute to the achievement of the NAPS global poverty 
reduction target of less than 2 per cent living in consistent income poverty by 2007. 
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